View source for Module:Argument

{{Short description|Attempt to persuade or to determine the truth of a conclusion}}
{{About|the subject as it is studied in logic and philosophy}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2020}}
An '''argument''' is a statement or group of statements called [[premise]]s intended to determine the degree of truth or acceptability of another statement called a conclusion.<ref>Ralph H. Johnson, ''[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781135691202 Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument]'' (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 2000), 46–49.</ref><ref>This is called "argument-as-product", distinguished from "argument-as-process" and "argument-as-procedure."

Wenzel, J. W. (1987). The rhetorical perspective on argument. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Across the lines of discipline. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 101–109). Dordrecht-Providence: Foris.</ref> Arguments can be studied from three main perspectives: the [[logic]]al, the [[dialectic]]al and the [[rhetoric]]al perspective.<ref>{{Citation |last=Wagemans |first=Jean H. M. |title=The Philosophy of Argument |date=2021-12-02 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108698283%23CN-bp-31/type/book_part |work=The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language |pages=571–589 |editor-last=Stalmaszczyk |editor-first=Piotr |edition=1 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/9781108698283.032 |isbn=978-1-108-69828-3 |s2cid=244088211 |access-date=2022-05-02}}</ref>

In [[logic]], an argument is usually expressed not in [[natural language]] but in a symbolic [[formal language]], and it can be defined as any group of [[proposition]]s of which one is claimed to follow from the others through [[Deductive reasoning|deductively]] [[Validity (logic)|valid]] [[inference]]s that preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. This logical perspective on argument is relevant for scientific fields such as [[mathematics]] and [[computer science]]. Logic is the study of the forms of [[reason]]ing in arguments and the development of standards and criteria to evaluate arguments.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Copi |first1=Irving M. |last2=Cohen |first2=Carl |last3=McMahon |first3=Kenneth |date=2016-09-09 |title=Introduction to Logic |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315510897 |doi=10.4324/9781315510897|isbn=9781315510880 }}</ref> [[Deductive argument]]s can be [[Validity (logic)|valid]], and the valid ones can be [[Soundness|sound]]: in a valid argument, premisses necessitate the conclusion, even if one or more of the premises is false and the conclusion is false; in a sound argument, true premises necessitate a true conclusion. [[Inductive argument]]s, by contrast, can have different degrees of logical strength: the stronger or more cogent the argument, the greater the probability that the conclusion is true, the weaker the argument, the lesser that probability.<ref>[http://www.iep.utm.edu/ded-ind/ "Deductive and Inductive Arguments"], [[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]].</ref> The standards for evaluating non-deductive arguments may rest on different or additional criteria than truth—for example, the persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability claims" in [[transcendental arguments]],<ref>Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", ''Philosophical Arguments'' (Harvard, 1995), 20–33. "[Transcendental] arguments consist of a string of what one could call indispensability claims. They move from their starting points to their conclusions by showing that the condition stated in the conclusion is indispensable to the feature identified at the start&nbsp;... Thus we could spell out Kant's transcendental deduction in the first edition in three stages: experience must have an object, that is, be ''of'' something; for this it must be coherent; and to be coherent it must be shaped by the understanding through the categories."</ref> the quality of hypotheses in [[retroduction]], or even the [[world disclosure|disclosure]] of new possibilities for thinking and acting.<ref>{{cite book |last=Kompridis |first=Nikolas |title=Critique and Disclosure |publisher=MIT Press |year=2006 |isbn=0262277425 |location=Cambridge |pages=116–124 |chapter=World Disclosing Arguments?}}</ref>

In [[dialectic]]s, and also in a more colloquial sense, an argument can be conceived as a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least contend with, a conflict or difference of opinion that has arisen or exists between two or more parties.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |date=August 1990 |title=What is Reasoning? What Is an Argument? |url=http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=jphil_1990_0087_0008_0399_0419&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |volume=87 |issue=8 |pages=399–419 |doi=10.2307/2026735 |jstor=2026735 }}{{Dead link|date=June 2022 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> For the [[rhetoric]]al perspective, the argument is constitutively linked with the context, in particular with the time and place in which the argument is located. From this perspective, the argument is evaluated not just by two parties (as in a dialectical approach) but also by an audience.<ref>{{Citation |last1=van Eemeren |first1=Frans H. |title=Informal Logic |date=2021 |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6883-3_7-1 |work=Handbook of Argumentation Theory |pages=1–45 |editor-last=van Eemeren |editor-first=Frans H. |place=Dordrecht |publisher=Springer Netherlands |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-94-007-6883-3_7-1 |isbn=978-94-007-6883-3 |access-date=2022-05-02 |last2=Garssen |first2=Bart |last3=Krabbe |first3=Erik C. W. |last4=Snoeck Henkemans |first4=A. Francisca |last5=Verheij |first5=Bart |last6=Wagemans |first6=Jean H. M. |editor2-last=Garssen |editor2-first=Bart |editor3-last=Verheij |editor3-first=Bart |editor4-last=Krabbe |editor4-first=Erik C. W.}}</ref> In both dialectic and rhetoric, arguments are used not through a formal but through natural language. Since classical antiquity, philosophers and rhetoricians have developed lists of argument types in which premises and conclusions are connected in informal and defeasible ways.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wagemans |first=Jean H.M. |date=2016 |title=Constructing a Periodic Table of Arguments |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2769833 |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.2769833 |issn=1556-5068}}</ref>

== Etymology ==
The Latin root ''arguere'' (to make bright, enlighten, make known, prove, etc.) is from [[Proto-Indo-European]] ''argu-yo-'', suffixed form of ''arg-'' (to shine; white).<ref>{{cite dictionary |title=Argue |dictionary=[[Online Etymology Dictionary]] |url=https://www.etymonline.com/word/argue |access-date=15 June 2018 |last=Harper |first=Douglas |author-link=Douglas Harper |publisher=MaoningTech}}</ref>

== Formal and informal ==
{{Further|Informal logic|Formal logic}}

Informal arguments as studied in ''informal logic'', are presented in [[ordinary language]] and are intended for everyday [[discourse]]. Formal arguments are studied in ''formal logic'' (historically called ''symbolic logic'', more commonly referred to as ''mathematical logic'' today) and are expressed in a [[formal language]]. Informal logic emphasizes the study of [[argumentation]]; formal logic emphasizes [[Entailment|implication]] and [[inference]]. Informal arguments are sometimes implicit. The rational structure—the relationship of claims, premises, warrants, relations of implication, and conclusion—is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must be made explicit by analysis.

== Standard logical account of argument types ==
[[File:Argument terminology used in logic (en).svg|thumb|400px|Argument terminology]]
There are several kinds of arguments in logic, the best-known of which are "deductive" and "inductive." An argument has one or more premises but only one conclusion. Each premise and the conclusion are [[Truthbearer|truth bearers]] or "truth-candidates", each capable of being either true or false (but not both). These truth values bear on the terminology used with arguments.

=== Deductive arguments ===
{{Main|Deductive argument}}

A ''deductive argument'' asserts that the [[truth]] of the conclusion is a [[logical consequence]] of the premises: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. It would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion, because negation of the conclusion is contradictory to the truth of the premises. Based on the premises, the conclusion follows necessarily (with certainty). Given premises that A=B and B=C, then the conclusion follows necessarily that A=C. Deductive arguments are sometimes referred to as "truth-preserving" arguments. For example, consider the argument that because bats can fly (premise=true), and all flying creatures are birds (premise=false), therefore bats are birds (conclusion=false). If we assume the premises are true, the conclusion follows necessarily, and it is a valid argument.

==== Validity ====
{{Main|Validity (logic)}}

Deductive arguments may be either valid or invalid. If valid, it has a conclusion that is [[Entailment|entailed]] by its premises; if its premises are true, the conclusion must be true. An argument is formally valid [[if and only if]] the denial of the conclusion is incompatible with accepting all the premises.

The validity of an argument depends not on the actual truth or falsity of its premises and conclusion, but on whether the argument has a valid [[Argument form|logical form]]. The validity of an argument is not a guarantee of the truth of its conclusion. A valid argument may have false premises that render it inconclusive: the conclusion of a valid argument with one or more false premises may be true or false.

Logic seeks to discover the forms that make arguments valid. A form of argument is valid if and only if the conclusion is true under all interpretations of that argument in which the premises are true. Since the validity of an argument depends on its form, an argument can be shown invalid by showing that its form is invalid. This can be done by a counter example of the same form of argument with premises that are true under a given interpretation, but a conclusion that is false under that interpretation. In informal logic this is called a [[counter argument]].

The form of an argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form, there is a corresponding statement form, called a [[corresponding conditional (logic)|corresponding conditional]], and an argument form is valid if and only if its corresponding conditional is a [[logical truth]]. A statement form which is logically true is also said to be a valid statement form. A statement form is a logical truth if it is true under all [[Interpretation (logic)|interpretations]]. A statement form can be shown to be a logical truth by either (a) showing that it is a [[tautology (logic)|tautology]] or (b) by means of a [[proof procedure]].

The corresponding conditional of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true ''in all possible worlds'') and so the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. If the conclusion, itself, is a necessary truth, it is without regard to the premises.

Some examples:
* ''All Greeks are human and all humans are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are mortal.'' : Valid argument; if the premises are true the conclusion must be true.
* ''Some Greeks are logicians and some logicians are tiresome; therefore, some Greeks are tiresome.'' Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be Romans (for example).
* ''Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved; therefore, we are all doomed.'' Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (This does not mean the conclusion has to be true; it is only true if the premises are true, which they may not be!)
* ''Some men are hawkers. Some hawkers are rich. Therefore, some men are rich.'' Invalid argument. This can be easier seen by giving a counter-example with the same argument form:
** ''Some people are herbivores. ''Some herbivores are zebras. Therefore, some people are zebras.'' Invalid argument, as it is possible that the premises be true and the conclusion false.''

In the above second to last case (Some men are hawkers&nbsp;...), the counter-example follows the same logical form as the previous argument, (Premise 1: "Some ''X'' are ''Y''." Premise 2: "Some ''Y'' are ''Z''." Conclusion: "Some ''X'' are ''Z''.") in order to demonstrate that whatever hawkers may be, they may or may not be rich, in consideration of the premises as such. (See also: [[Existential import]]).

The forms of argument that render deductions valid are well-established, however some invalid arguments can also be persuasive depending on their construction ([[inductive arguments]], for example). (See also: [[Formal fallacy]] and [[Informal fallacy]]).

==== Soundness ====
{{Main|Soundness}}

A sound argument is a valid argument whose conclusion follows from its premise(s), and the premise(s) of which is/are true.

=== Inductive arguments ===
{{Main|Inductive reasoning}}
An [[inductive argument]] asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by the probability of the premises. For example, given that the [[military budget of the United States]] is the largest in the world (premise=true), then it is probable that it will remain so for the next 10 years (conclusion=true). Arguments that involve predictions are inductive since the future is uncertain. An inductive argument is said to be strong or weak. If the premises of an inductive argument are assumed true, is it probable the conclusion is also true? If yes, the argument is strong. If no, it is weak. A strong argument is said to be cogent if it has all true premises. Otherwise, the argument is uncogent. The military budget argument example is a strong, cogent argument.

Non-deductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the conclusion but do not entail it. Forms of non-deductive logic include the [[statistical syllogism]], which argues from generalizations true for the most part, and [[inductive inference|induction]], a form of reasoning that makes generalizations based on individual instances. An inductive argument is said to be ''cogent'' if and only if the truth of the argument's premises would render the truth of the conclusion probable (i.e., the argument is ''strong''), and the argument's premises are, in fact, true. Cogency can be considered [[inductive logic]]'s analogue to [[deductive logic]]'s "[[soundness]]". Despite its name, [[mathematical induction]] is not a form of inductive reasoning. The lack of deductive validity is known as the [[problem of induction]].

== Defeasible arguments and argumentation schemes ==
{{Main|Argumentation scheme}}
In modern argumentation theories, arguments are regarded as defeasible passages from premises to a conclusion. Defeasibility means that when additional information (new evidence or contrary arguments) is provided, the premises may be no longer lead to the conclusion ([[non-monotonic reasoning]]). This type of reasoning is referred to as [[defeasible reasoning]]. For instance we consider the famous Tweety example:
:: Tweety is a bird.
:: Birds generally fly.
:: Therefore, Tweety (probably) flies.

This argument is reasonable and the premises support the conclusion unless additional information indicating that the case is an exception comes in. If Tweety is a penguin, the inference is no longer justified by the premise. Defeasible arguments are based on generalizations that hold only in the majority of cases, but are subject to exceptions and defaults.

In order to represent and assess defeasible reasoning, it is necessary to combine the logical rules (governing the acceptance of a conclusion based on the acceptance of its premises) with rules of material inference, governing how a premise can support a given conclusion (whether it is reasonable or not to draw a specific conclusion from a specific description of a state of affairs).

[[Argumentation scheme]]s have been developed to describe and assess the acceptability or the [[Fallacy|fallaciousness]] of defeasible arguments. Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combining semantic-ontological relations with types of reasoning and logical axioms and representing the abstract structure of the most common types of natural arguments.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Macagno|first1=Fabrizio|last2=Walton|first2=Douglas|title=Classifying the patterns of natural arguments|journal=Philosophy & Rhetoric |date=2015|volume=48|issue=1|pages=26–53|doi=10.5325/philrhet.48.1.0026|url=https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=crrarpub}}</ref> A typical example is the argument from expert opinion, shown below, which has two premises and a conclusion.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Reed|first2=Chris|last3=Macagno|first3=Fabrizio|title=Argumentation Schemes|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York|page=310}}</ref>
     
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Argument from expert opinion
|-
| Major Premise:|| Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
|-
| Minor Premise:|| E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
|-
| Conclusion: || A is true (false).
|}

Each scheme may be associated with a set of critical questions, namely criteria for assessing dialectically the reasonableness and acceptability of an argument. The matching critical questions are the standard ways of casting the argument into doubt.

== By analogy ==
Argument by [[analogy]] may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular. An argument by analogy may use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar particular truth in the conclusion. For example, if A. Plato was mortal, and B. Socrates was like Plato in other respects, then asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an example of argument by analogy because the reasoning employed in it proceeds from a particular truth in a premise (Plato was mortal) to a similar particular truth in the conclusion, namely that Socrates was mortal.

== Other kinds ==
Other kinds of arguments may have different or additional standards of validity or justification. For example, philosopher [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] said that so-called [[transcendental arguments]] are made up of a "chain of indispensability claims" that attempt to show why something is necessarily true based on its connection to our experience,<ref>Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", ''Philosophical Arguments'' (Harvard, 1995), 20–33.</ref> while [[Nikolas Kompridis]] has suggested that there are two types of "[[fallible]]" arguments: one based on truth claims, and the other based on the time-responsive disclosure of possibility ([[world disclosure]]).<ref>Nikolas Kompridis, "Two Kinds of Fallibilism", ''Critique and Disclosure'' (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 180–183.</ref> Kompridis said that the French philosopher [[Michel Foucault]] was a prominent advocate of this latter form of philosophical argument.<ref>Nikolas Kompridis, "Disclosure as (Intimate) Critique", ''Critique and Disclosure'' (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 254. In addition, Foucault said of his own approach that "My role&nbsp;... is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed." He also wrote that he was engaged in "the process of putting historico-critical reflection to the ''test of concrete practices''&nbsp;... I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty." (emphasis added) Hubert Dreyfus, "[http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.html Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault]" and Michel Foucault, [http://foucault.info/documents/whatIsEnlightenment/foucault.whatIsEnlightenment.en.html "What is Enlightenment?"]</ref>

=== World-disclosing ===
{{Main|World disclosure}}
World-disclosing arguments are a group of philosophical arguments that according to Nikolas Kompridis employ a [[world disclosure|disclosive]] approach, to reveal features of a wider [[ontology|ontological]] or cultural-linguistic understanding—a "world", in a specifically ontological sense—in order to clarify or transform the background of meaning ([[tacit knowledge]]) and what Kompridis has called the "logical space" on which an argument implicitly depends.<ref>Nikolas Kompridis, "World Disclosing ''Arguments''?" in ''Critique and Disclosure'', Cambridge: MIT Press (2006), 118–121.</ref>

== Explanations ==
{{Main|Explanation}}

While arguments attempt to show that something was, is, will be, or should be the case, explanations try to show ''why'' or ''how'' something is or will be. If Fred and Joe address the issue of ''whether'' or not Fred's cat has fleas, Joe may state: "Fred, your cat has fleas. Observe, the cat is scratching right now." Joe has made an ''argument that'' the cat has fleas. However, if Joe asks Fred, "Why is your cat scratching itself?" the explanation, "...&nbsp;because it has fleas." provides understanding.

Both the above argument and explanation require knowing the generalities that a) fleas often cause itching, and b) that one often scratches to relieve itching. The difference is in the intent: an argument attempts to settle whether or not some [[claim (logic)|claim]] is true, and an explanation attempts to provide understanding of the event. Note, that by subsuming the specific event (of Fred's cat scratching) as an instance of the general rule that "animals scratch themselves when they have fleas", Joe will no longer wonder ''why'' Fred's cat is scratching itself. Arguments address problems of belief, explanations address problems of understanding. Also note that in the argument above, the statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is up for debate (i.e. is a claim), but in the explanation, the statement, "Fred's cat has fleas" is assumed to be true (unquestioned at this time) and just needs ''explaining''.<ref name= "ReferenceA">{{cite journal|first1 = Jonathan F.|last1= Osborne|first2= Alexis |last2=Patterson |doi = 10.1002/sce.20438 |date = 23 May 2011 |publisher = Wiley Online Library|title = Scientific argument and explanation: A necessary distinction?|journal = Science Education|volume = 95|issue = 4|pages = 627–638|bibcode= 2011SciEd..95..627O}}</ref>

Arguments and explanations largely resemble each other in [[rhetoric]]al use. This is the cause of much difficulty in [[critical thinking|thinking critically]] about claims. There are several reasons for this difficulty.

* People often are not themselves clear on whether they are arguing for or explaining something.
* The same types of words and phrases are used in presenting explanations and arguments.
* The terms 'explain' or 'explanation,' et cetera are frequently used in arguments.
* Explanations are often used within arguments and presented so as to serve ''as arguments''.<ref>''Critical Thinking'', Parker and Moore</ref>
* Likewise, "...&nbsp;arguments are essential to the process of justifying the validity of any explanation as there are often multiple explanations for any given phenomenon."<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

Explanations and arguments are often studied in the field of [[information systems]] to help explain user acceptance of [[knowledge-based systems]]. Certain argument types may fit better with personality traits to enhance acceptance by individuals.<ref>Justin Scott Giboney, Susan Brown, and Jay F. Nunamaker Jr. (2012). "User Acceptance of Knowledge-Based System Recommendations: Explanations, Arguments, and Fit" 45th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, January 5–8.</ref>

== Fallacies and non-arguments ==
{{Main|Fallacy}}

Fallacies are types of argument or expressions which are held to be of an invalid form or contain errors in reasoning.

One type of fallacy occurs when a word frequently used to indicate a conclusion is used as a transition (conjunctive adverb) between independent clauses. In English the words ''therefore'', ''so'', ''because'' and ''hence'' typically separate the premises from the conclusion of an argument. Thus: ''Socrates is a man, all men are mortal therefore Socrates is mortal'' is an argument because the assertion ''Socrates is mortal'' follows from the preceding statements. However, ''I was thirsty and therefore I drank'' is not an argument, despite its appearance. It is not being claimed that ''I drank'' is logically entailed by ''I was thirsty''. The ''therefore'' in this sentence indicates ''for that reason'' not ''it follows that''.

== Elliptical or ethymematic arguments ==
Often an argument is invalid or weak because there is a missing premise—the supply of which would make it valid or strong. This is referred to as an elliptical or enthymematic argument (see also {{slink|Enthymeme#Syllogism with an unstated premise}}). Speakers and writers will often leave out a necessary premise in their reasoning if it is widely accepted and the writer does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: ''All metals expand when heated, therefore iron will expand when heated.'' The missing premise is: ''Iron is a metal.'' On the other hand, a seemingly valid argument may be found to lack a premise—a "hidden assumption"—which, if highlighted, can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness reasoned: ''Nobody came out the front door except the milkman; therefore the murderer must have left by the back door.'' The hidden assumptions are: (1) the milkman was not the murderer and (2) the murderer has left (3) by a door and (4) not by e.g. a window or through ''an 'ole in 't roof'' and (5) there are no other doors than the front or back door.

== Argument mining ==
{{Main|Argument mining}}
The goal of argument mining is the automatic extraction and identification of argumentative structures from [[natural language]] text with the aid of computer programs.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Lippi|first1=Marco|last2=Torroni|first2=Paolo|date=2016-04-20|title=Argumentation Mining: State of the Art and Emerging Trends|url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2850417|journal=ACM Transactions on Internet Technology|language=en|volume=16|issue=2|pages=1–25|doi=10.1145/2850417|hdl=11585/523460|s2cid=9561587|issn=1533-5399}}</ref> Such argumentative structures include the premise, conclusions, the [[argument scheme]] and the relationship between the main and subsidiary argument, or the main and counter-argument within discourse.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Argument Mining - IJCAI2016 Tutorial|url=https://www.i3s.unice.fr/~villata/tutorialIJCAI2016.html|access-date=2021-03-09|website=www.i3s.unice.fr|archive-date=18 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418083659/https://www.i3s.unice.fr/~villata/tutorialIJCAI2016.html|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=NLP Approaches to Computational Argumentation – ACL 2016, Berlin|url=http://acl2016tutorial.arg.tech/|access-date=2021-03-09|language=en-GB}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|Philosophy}}
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Abductive reasoning]]
* [[Argument map]]
* [[Argumentation theory]]
* [[Bayes' theorem]]
* [[Belief bias]]
* [[Boolean logic]]
* [[Cosmological argument]]
* [[Critical thinking]]
* [[Dialectic]]
* [[Evidence]]
* [[Evidence-based policy]]
* [[Inquiry]]
* [[Logical reasoning]]
* [[Practical arguments]]
* [[Proof (truth)]]
* [[Soundness theorem]]
* [[Syllogism]]
{{Div col end}}

== Notes ==
{{Reflist|30em}}

== References ==
* {{cite book|last=Shaw|first=Warren Choate|year=1922|title=The Art of Debate|publisher=Allyn and Bacon|ref=Shaw1922|url=https://archive.org/details/artdebate00shawgoog|quote=argument by analogy.|page=[https://archive.org/details/artdebate00shawgoog/page/n92 74]}}
* [[Robert Audi]], ''Epistemology'', Routledge, 1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship between knowledge, inference and argument.
* J. L. Austin ''[[How to Do Things With Words]]'', Oxford University Press, 1976.
* H. P. Grice, ''Logic and Conversation'' in ''The Logic of Grammar'', Dickenson, 1975.
* [[Vincent F. Hendricks]], ''Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression'', New York: Automatic Press / VIP, 2005, {{ISBN|87-991013-7-8}}
* R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J. Perlis, ''[https://www.ics.uci.edu/~pattis/misc/socialproofs.pdf Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs]'', Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1979. A classic article on the social process of acceptance of proofs in mathematics.
* [[Yu. Manin]], ''A Course in Mathematical Logic'', Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the formal structure of logic.
* [[Chaïm Perelman|Ch. Perelman]] and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, ''The New Rhetoric'', Notre Dame, 1970. This classic was originally published in French in 1958.
* [[Henri Poincaré]], ''Science and Hypothesis'', Dover Publications, 1952
* Frans van Eemeren and [[Rob Grootendorst]], ''Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions'', Foris Publications, 1984.
* [[K. R. Popper]] ''Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach'', Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
* [[L. S. Stebbing]], ''A Modern Introduction to Logic'', Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic.
* [[Douglas N. Walton]], ''Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation'', Cambridge, 1998.
* Walton, Douglas; Christopher Reed; Fabrizio Macagno, ''Argumentation Schemes'', New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
* Carlos Chesñevar, Ana Maguitman and [[Ronald Loui]], ''Logical Models of Argument'', ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 32, num. 4, pp.&nbsp;337–383, 2000.
* [[T. Edward Damer]]. ''[[Attacking Faulty Reasoning]]'', 5th Edition, Wadsworth, 2005. {{ISBN|0-534-60516-8}}
* Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. 1989.
* Charles Arthur Willard, [https://philpapers.org/rec/WILAAT-22 Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge]. 1982.

== Further reading ==
* Salmon, Wesley C. ''Logic''. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (1963). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 63–10528.
* Aristotle, ''Prior and Posterior Analytics''. Ed. and trans. John Warrington. London: Dent (1964)
* Mates, Benson. ''Elementary Logic''. New York: OUP (1972). Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 74–166004.
* Mendelson, Elliot. ''Introduction to Mathematical Logic''. New York: Van Nostran Reinholds Company (1964).
* Frege, Gottlob. ''The Foundations of Arithmetic''. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1980).
* [[Brian Martin (social scientist)|Martin, Brian]]. ''[http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/14cm/14cm.pdf The Controversy Manual]'' (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2014).

== External links ==
{{Commons category|Arguments}}

* {{PhilPapers|category|argument}}
* {{InPho|idea|1437}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=argument |title=Argument and Argumentation |last=Dutilh Novaes |first=Catarina}}
* {{cite IEP |url-id=argument |title=Argument |last=McKeon |first=Matthew}}

{{Fallacies}}
{{Mathematical logic}}
{{Philosophical logic}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Arguments| ]]
[[Category:Critical thinking skills]]
[[Category:Logical consequence]]
[[Category:Reasoning]]