View source for Module:Mass surveillance

{{short description|Intricate surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2019}}{{Use British English|date=March 2021}}
{{Global surveillance}}

'''Mass surveillance''' is the intricate [[surveillance]] of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population in order to monitor that group of citizens.<ref>{{cite web |title=Mass Surveillance |url=https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/52 |publisher=Privacy International |access-date=20 April 2017}}</ref> The surveillance is often carried out by local and federal governments or [[intelligence agency|governmental organizations]], such as organizations like the [[NSA]], but it may also be carried out by corporations (either on behalf of governments or at their own initiative). Depending on each nation's laws and [[Judiciary|judicial systems]], the legality of and the permission required to engage in mass surveillance varies. It is the single most indicative distinguishing trait of [[Totalitarianism|totalitarian regimes]]. It is also often distinguished from [[targeted surveillance]].

Mass surveillance has often been cited as necessary to fight [[terrorism]], prevent [[crime]] and [[social unrest]], protect [[national security]], and control the population. At the same time, mass surveillance has equally often been criticized for violating [[privacy]] rights, limiting [[Civil and political rights|civil and political rights and freedoms]], and being illegal under some legal or constitutional systems.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Watt|first=Eliza|date=2017-09-02|title='The right to privacy and the future of mass surveillance'|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1298091|journal=The International Journal of Human Rights|volume=21|issue=7|pages=773–799|doi=10.1080/13642987.2017.1298091|s2cid=148928418|issn=1364-2987}}</ref> Another criticism is that increasing mass surveillance could lead to the development of a [[#Surveillance state|surveillance state]] or an [[#Electronic police state|electronic police state]] where civil liberties are infringed or political dissent is undermined by [[COINTELPRO]]-like programs. Such a state could be referred to as a [[Totalitarianism|totalitarian state]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Giroux|first=Henry A.|title=Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State|journal=Cultural Studies|year=2015|volume=29|issue=2|pages=108–140|doi=10.1080/09502386.2014.917118|s2cid=143580193}}</ref>

In 2013, the practice of mass surveillance by world<ref>
{{citation
|url=http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/u-s-prism-meet-chinas-golden-shield/
|title=U.S. Prism, Meet China's Golden Shield
|last=TATLOW
|first=DIDI KIRSTEN
|date=28 June 2013
|quote= [...] a Beijing lawyer named Xie Yanyi filed a public information request with the police asking about China's own surveillance operations. [...] 'Most people were critical about the U.S. and supported Snowden.' [he said...] Then the discussion started shifting to take in China's own surveillance issues.
}}
</ref> governments was called into question after [[Edward Snowden]]'s [[2013 Global surveillance disclosure|2013 global surveillance disclosure]] on the practices by the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) of the United States. Reporting based on documents Snowden leaked to various media outlets triggered a debate about civil liberties and the [[right to privacy]] in the [[Digital Age]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Mark Hosenball and John Whitesides|title=Reports on surveillance of Americans fuel debate over privacy, security|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wiretaps-verizon-idUSBRE95502920130607|newspaper=[[Reuters]]|access-date=17 December 2013|date=7 June 2013}}</ref> Mass surveillance is considered a global issue.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kuehn|first1=Kathleen|title=The Post-Snowden Era: Mass Surveillance and Privacy in New Zealand|publisher=Bridget Williams Books|isbn=9780908321087|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JP6lDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA47|access-date=8 January 2017|language=en|date=9 December 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Snowden: Mass Surveillance Needs Global Solution|url=https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/04/074526933/Snowden-Mass-Surveillance-Needs-Global-Solution|access-date=8 January 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Lyon|first1=David|title=Surveillance After Snowden|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=9780745690889|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gBbICgAAQBAJ&pg=PT46|access-date=8 January 2017|language=en|date=19 October 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Towards a world without mass surveillance|url=https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/submissions/Towards_a_world_without_mass_surveillance.pdf|access-date=8 January 2017}}</ref> [[The Aerospace Corporation]] of the United States describes a near-future event they call the "[https://csps.aerospace.org/papers/future-ubiquitous-real-time-intelligence-geoint-singularity GEOINT Singularity]" in which everything on the surface of the earth will be monitored at all times, analyzed by artificial intelligence systems, and then redistributed and made available to the general public globally in realtime.<ref name="ForeignAffairs">{{cite magazine|last1=Vinci|first1=Anthony|date=2020-08-31|title=The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: How Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Will Transform Espionage|volume=99|number=5|magazine=[[Foreign Affairs]]|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2020-08-31/coming-revolution-intelligence-affairs|issn=0015-7120|url-access=subscription|df=mdy-all}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=The Future of Ubiquitous, Real-Time Intelligence – A GEOINT Singularity {{!}} Aerospace Center for Space Policy and Strategy |url=https://csps.aerospace.org/papers/future-ubiquitous-real-time-intelligence-geoint-singularity |access-date=2022-04-19 |website=csps.aerospace.org |language=en}}</ref>

==By country==
[[Privacy International]]'s 2007 survey, covering 47 countries, indicated that there had been an increase in surveillance and a decline in the performance of privacy safeguards, compared to the previous year. Balancing these factors, eight countries were rated as being 'endemic surveillance societies'. Of these eight, [[China]], [[Malaysia]] and [[Russia]] scored lowest, followed jointly by [[Singapore]] and the [[United Kingdom]], then jointly by [[Taiwan]], [[Thailand]] and the [[United States]]. The best ranking was given to [[Greece]], which was judged to have 'adequate safeguards against abuse'.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/surveillance-monitor-2007-international-country-rankings |title=Surveillance Monitor 2007 - International country rankings |publisher=[[Privacy International]] |date=28 December 2007 |access-date=16 September 2013 |archive-date=8 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108235258/https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/surveillance-monitor-2007-international-country-rankings |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Many countries throughout the world have already been adding thousands of [[surveillance cameras]] to their urban, suburban and even rural areas.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=9662 |title=Police Surveillance: Go Snoop, Yourself |author=Tom Steinert-Threlkeld |work=ZDNet |date=13 August 2008 |access-date=13 August 2008 |archive-date=11 September 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080911195308/http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=9662 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="yougov1">{{cite web |url=http://www.yougov.co.uk/extranets/ygarchives/content/pdf/TEL060101024_3.pdf |title=YouGov / Daily Telegraph Survey Results |year=2006 |publisher=YouGov |access-date=15 September 2013}}</ref> For example, in September 2007 the [[American Civil Liberties Union]] (ACLU) stated that we are "in danger of tipping into a genuine surveillance society completely alien to American values" with "the potential for a dark future where our every move, our every transaction, our every communication is recorded, compiled, and stored away, ready to be examined and used against us by the authorities whenever they want".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/why-surveillance-society-clock |publisher=American Civil Liberties Union |title= Why a Surveillance Society Clock? |date=4 September 2007 |access-date=15 September 2013}}</ref>

On 12 March 2013, [[Reporters Without Borders]] published a ''Special report on Internet Surveillance''. The report included a list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in active, intrusive surveillance of news providers, resulting in grave violations of freedom of information and human rights. Five countries were placed on the initial list: [[Bahrain]], [[China]], [[Iran]], [[Syria]], and [[Vietnam]].<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013>[http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/ ''The Enemies of the Internet Special Edition : Surveillance''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130831072750/http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/ |date=31 August 2013 }}, Reporters Without Borders, 12 March 2013</ref>

===Australia===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in Australia}}

===Bahrain===
[[Bahrain]] is one of the five countries on Reporters Without Borders' March 2013 list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in active, intrusive surveillance of news providers, resulting in grave violations of freedom of information and human rights. The level of Internet filtering and surveillance in Bahrain is one of the highest in the world. The royal family is represented in all areas of Internet management and has sophisticated tools at its disposal for spying on its subjects. The online activities of dissidents and news providers are closely monitored and the surveillance is increasing.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

Media reports published in July 2021 exposed the use of [[NSO Group]]'s phone malware software, [[Pegasus (spyware)|Pegasus]], for spying on rights activists, lawyers, and journalists, globally, by authoritarian governments. Bahrain was among the many countries listed as the Israeli firm's clients accused of hacking and conducting unauthorized mass surveillance using phone malware despite a poor human rights record. The software is said to infect devices, allowing its operators to get access to the target's messages, photos, record calls, and activate the microphone and camera.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57881364|title=Pegasus: Spyware sold to governments 'targets activists'|work=BBC News|date=19 July 2021|accessdate=19 July 2021}}</ref>

Yusuf al-Jamri had no idea that even after fleeing Bahrain, he won’t be able to escape the government’s prying eyes, even after taking asylum in the UK. After moving to the UK and getting his asylum request accepted, Al-Jamri legally filed charges against Bahrain along with the notorious spyware firm, NSO Group for infecting his phone with a malware, built with military-grade technology in August 2019. The hacking was verified by the researchers at Toronto based CitizenLab. As a result of which Yusuf complained of being subjected to personal injury, loss of privacy, distress and anxiety. Al-Jamri’s lawyers made claims about the same in a pre-claim letter sent to both the accused, NSO Group and the Bahraini government. No response was received from the two on being approached for comments.<ref>{{cite_web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/06/no-safe-haven-the-bahraini-dissident-still-menaced-after-gaining-uk-asylum|title=No safe haven? The Bahraini dissident still menaced after gaining UK asylum|accessdate=6 December 2022|website=The Guardian}}</ref>

===Canada===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in Canada}}

===China===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in China}}
[[China]] is one of the five countries on [[Reporters Without Borders]]' March 2013 list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in active, intrusive surveillance of news providers, resulting in grave violations of freedom of information and basic human rights.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/ZWwzDnq7poQ Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20210213232110/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWwzDnq7poQ Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{Citation|title=How China's Mass Surveillance Works|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWwzDnq7poQ|language=en|access-date=2021-10-05}}{{cbignore}}</ref> All Internet access in China is owned or controlled by the state or the [[Chinese Communist Party]].<ref name=":82">{{Cite book |last1=Chin |first1=Josh |url=https://archive.org/details/surveillancestat0000chin |title=Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control |last2=Lin |first2=Liza |date=2022 |isbn=978-1-250-24929-6 |edition=1st |location=New York |oclc=1315574672}}</ref> Many foreign journalists in China have said that they take for granted that their telephones are tapped and their email is monitored.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

The tools put in place to filter and monitor the Internet are collectively known as the [[Great Firewall of China]]. Besides the usual routing regulations that allow access to an IP address or a particular domain name to be blocked, the Great Firewall makes large-scale use of [[Deep Packet Inspection]] (DPI) technology to monitor and block access based on keyword detection. The Great Firewall has the ability to dynamically block [[Encryption|encrypted]] connections. One of the country's main ISPs, [[China Unicom]], automatically cuts a connection as soon as it is used to transmit encrypted content.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

The monitoring system developed by China is not confined to the Great Firewall, monitoring is also built into social networks, chat services and VoIP. Private companies are directly responsible to the Chinese authorities for surveillance of their networks to ensure banned messages are not circulated. The [[Tencent QQ|QQ]] application, owned by the firm Tencent, allows the authorities to monitor in detail exchanges between Internet users by seeking certain keywords and expressions. The author of each message can be identified by his or her user number. The QQ application is effectively a giant Trojan horse. And since March 2012, new legislation requires all new users of micro-blogging sites to register using their own name and telephone number.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

[[Skype]], one of the world's most popular Internet telephone platforms, is closely monitored. Skype services in China are available through a local partner, the TOM media group. The Chinese-language version of Skype, known as [[TOM-Skype]], is slightly different from the downloadable versions in other countries. A report by [[OpenNet Initiative|OpenNet Initiative Asia]]<ref>[http://www.oni-asia.net/ ONI Asia] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170923235133/http://www.oni-asia.net/ |date=23 September 2017 }}, web site, OpenNet Initiative, retrieved 15 September 2013.</ref> says everyday conversations are captured on servers. Interception and storage of a conversation may be triggered by a sender's or recipient's name or by keywords that occur in the conversation.<ref>[http://www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf "Breaching Trust: An analysis of surveillance and security practices on China's TOM-Skype platform"], Nart Villeneuve, Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia, 1 October 2008.</ref>

On 31 January 2013, ''[[The New York Times]]'' reported that it had been the target of attacks by the Chinese hackers.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Perlroth|first=Nicole|date=2013-01-31|title=Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html|access-date=2021-03-20|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The first breach took place on 13 September 2012 when the newspaper was preparing to publish an article about the fortune amassed by the family of outgoing Prime Minister [[Wen Jiabao]]. The newspaper said the purpose of attacks was to identify the sources that supplied the newspaper with information about corruption among the prime minister's entourage. ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' and ''[[CNN]]'' also said they had been the targets of cyber attacks from China. In February, [[Twitter]] disclosed that the accounts of some 250,000 subscribers had been the victims of attacks from China similar to those carried out on ''The New York Times''. Mandiant, the company engaged by the NYT to secure its network, identified the source of the attacks as a group of hackers it called Advanced Persistent Threat 1, a unit of the People's Liberation Army operating from a 12-story building in the suburbs of Shanghai that had hundreds, possibly thousands, of staff and the direct support of the Chinese government.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

The newest form of mass surveillance in China is the [[Social Credit System]], where citizens and businesses are given or deducted good points based on social behavior such as adherence to laws, honesty, tax evasion or political activism.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/on-demand/2017/12/15/black-mirror-coming-true-china-rating-affects-home-transport/ |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/on-demand/2017/12/15/black-mirror-coming-true-china-rating-affects-home-transport/ |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |title=Black Mirror is coming true in China, where your 'rating' affects your home, transport and social circle |first=Alice |last=Vincent |date=15 December 2017 |newspaper=[[The Daily Telegraph]]}}{{cbignore}}</ref> Individuals can also be subject to travel restrictions such as bans on purchases of flights and high speed train tickets based on whether they have violated social norms, certain laws or engage in political activism against the government, subjecting violators to a form of virtual house arrest by confining them to a specific geographic area such as a particular town or city.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-05-02|title=China Law Translate- Social Credit Resources Page|url=https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-resources/|access-date=2021-07-25|website=China Law Translate|language=en-US}}</ref> The Chinese government also plans to network and interlink up to 20 million surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition as part of the [[Mass surveillance in China|'Skynet' project]] in order to track down wanted fugitives and suspects within minutes.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2018-10-04|title="Skynet", China's massive video surveillance network|url=https://www.scmp.com/abacus/who-what/what/article/3028246/skynet-chinas-massive-video-surveillance-network|access-date=2021-07-25|website=South China Morning Post|language=en}}</ref>

According to UK-based technology research organization, Comparitech, a city in [[China]] called [[Chongqing]] is the most surveilled city in the entire world, with 2.5m cameras watching over almost 15.35 million people. As per the data accumulated, the Chinese city beats [[Shanghai]], [[Beijing]], and [[Shenzhen]], in terms of [[mass surveillance in China]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/dec/02/big-brother-is-watching-chinese-city-with-26m-cameras-is-worlds-most-heavily-surveilled|title=Big Brother is watching: Chinese city with 2.6m cameras is world's most heavily surveilled|access-date=2 December 2019|website=The Guardian|date=2 December 2019}}</ref>

Internet surveillance is pervasive within China, under the [[Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China]], all SIM cards purchases require real name registration,<ref name=":82" /> all WiFi hotspots throughout the country require SMS verification through a phone number which is incidentally linked to a user's [[Resident Identity Card|resident ID card]] and all instant messaging and internet service providers including but not limited to ISP's, internet cafes and gaming service providers are required to verify the real identity of users through either a foreign passport or national ID card prior to the provision of a service. All domestic flight tickets and purchases of high speed train tickets and banking and financial services also require real name ID in order to be provided in order to be purchased.<ref>{{Cite web|title=China attempts to reinforce real-name registration for Internet users|url=https://social.techcrunch.com/2016/06/01/china-attempts-to-reinforce-real-name-registration-for-internet-users/|access-date=2021-07-25|website=TechCrunch |date=June 1, 2016 |first=Catherine |last=Shu |language=en-US}}</ref>

===East Germany===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in East Germany}}
Before the Digital Revolution, one of the world's biggest mass surveillance operations was carried out by the [[Stasi]], the [[secret police]] of the former [[East Germany]]. By the time the state collapsed in 1989, the Stasi had built up an estimated civilian network of 189,000 informants, who monitored even minute hints of political dissent among other citizens.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Welle (www.dw.com) |first=Deutsche |title=East German Stasi Had 189,000 Informers, Study Says {{!}} DW {{!}} 11.03.2008 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/east-german-stasi-had-189000-informers-study-says/a-3184486-1 |access-date=2022-03-12 |website=DW.COM |language=en-GB}}</ref> Many [[West Germany|West Germans]] visiting friends and family in East Germany were also subject to Stasi spying, as well as many high-ranking West German politicians and persons in the public eye.

Most East German citizens were well aware that their government was spying on them, which led to a culture of mistrust: touchy political issues were only discussed in the comfort of their own four walls and only with the closest of friends and family members, while widely maintaining a façade of unquestioning followership in public.

===European Union===
The right to [[privacy]] is a highly developed area of law in Europe. The [[Data Protection Directive]] regulates the processing of personal data within the [[European Union]]. For comparison, the US has no data protection law that is comparable to this; instead, the US regulates data protection on a sectoral basis.<ref>See Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 471, 472 (2000); Dean William Harvey & Amy White, The Impact of Computer Security Regulation on American Companies, 8 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 505 (2002); Kamaal Zaidi, Harmonizing U.S.-EU Online Privacy Law: Toward a U.S. Comprehensive Regime For the Protection of Personal Data, 12 Mich.St. J. Int’l L. 169 (2003).</ref>

Since early 2012, the European Union has been working on a [[General Data Protection Regulation]] to replace the Data Protection Directive and harmonise data protection and privacy law. On 20 October 2013, a committee at the [[European Parliament]] backed the measure, which, if it is enacted, could require American companies to seek clearance from European officials before complying with United States warrants seeking private data. The vote is part of efforts in Europe to shield citizens from online surveillance in the wake of [[2013 mass surveillance disclosures|revelations about a far-reaching spying program]] by the [[U.S. National Security Agency]].<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/business/international/eu-panel-backs-plan-to-shield-online-data.html "Rules Shielding Online Data From N.S.A. and Other Prying Eyes Advance in Europe"], James Kanter and Mike Scott, ''The New York Times'', 21 October 2013. Retrieved 22 October 2013.</ref> European Union justice and rights commissioner Viviane Reding said "The question has arisen whether the large-scale collection and processing of personal information under US surveillance programmes is necessary and proportionate to meet the interests of national security." The EU is also asking the US for changes to US legislation to match the legal redress offered in Europe; American citizens in Europe can go to the courts if they feel their rights are infringed but Europeans without right of residence in America cannot.<ref>{{cite news|last=Traynor|first=Ian|title=NSA surveillance: Europe threatens to freeze US data-sharing arrangements|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/nsa-surveillance-europe-threatens-freeze-us-data-sharing|access-date=1 December 2013|newspaper=The Guardian|date=26 November 2013}}</ref> When the EU / US arrangement to implement [[International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles]] were struck down by the European Court of Justice, a new framework for transatlantic data flows, called the "[[EU–US Privacy Shield|EU-US Privacy Shield]]", was adopted in July 2016.<ref>{{cite press release|title=EU Commission and United States agree on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm|publisher=European Commission|access-date=24 February 2016|date=2 February 2016|postscript=none}}; {{cite press release|title=Restoring trust in transatlantic data flows through strong safeguards: European Commission presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-433_en.htm|publisher=European Commission|access-date=7 March 2016|date=29 February 2016|postscript=none}}; {{cite press release|title=European Commission launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: stronger protection for transatlantic data flows|url=http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm|publisher=European Commission|access-date=16 July 2016|date=12 July 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=U.S. and Europe in 'Safe Harbor' Data Deal, but Legal Fight May Await|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/us-europe-safe-harbor-data-deal.html?_r=0|access-date=24 February 2016|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=2 February 2016|postscript=none}}; {{cite news|title=Privacy Shield deal lets US tech firms transfer European customers' data again|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/08/privacy-shield-data-transfer-us-european-union|access-date=8 July 2016|work=The Guardian|date=8 July 2016|postscript=none}}; {{cite news|title=Privacy Shield forced US to be 'transparent' about intelligence agencies|url=http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/privacy-shield-forced-us-to-be-transparent-about-intelligence-agencies/|work=EurActiv|access-date=16 July 2016|date=12 July 2016}}</ref>

In April 2014, the [[European Court of Justice]] declared invalid the EU Data Retention Directive. The Court said it violates two basic rights – respect for private life and protection of personal data.<ref>{{cite news|title=Top EU court rejects EU-wide data retention law|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26935096|access-date=7 September 2014|publisher=BBC|date=8 April 2014}}</ref> The [[European Union legislative procedure|legislative body]] of the [[European Union]] passed the Data Retention Directive on 15 December 2005. It requires that telecommunication operators retain metadata for telephone, Internet, and other telecommunication services for periods of not less than six months and not more than two years from the date of the communication as determined by each EU member state and, upon request, to make the data available to various governmental bodies. Access to this information is not limited to investigation of serious crimes, nor is a warrant required for access.<ref>[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF "Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC"], L 105/54, ''Official Journal of the European Union'', 13 April 2006. Retrieved 20 September 2013.</ref><ref>[http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/images/DRletter_Malmstroem.pdf "Joint letter to Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, from Dr. Patrick Breyer and 105 additional parties"], 22 June 2010.</ref>

Undertaken under the ''[[Seventh Framework Programme]]'' ''for research and technological development'' (FP7 - Science in Society<ref>[http://cordis.europa.eu/search/index.cfm?fuseaction=prog.document&PG_RCN=8748316 "FP7 - Science in Society"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120126224045/http://cordis.europa.eu/search/index.cfm?fuseaction=prog.document&PG_RCN=8748316 |date=26 January 2012 }}, Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS), European Commission, 30 December 2006.</ref>) some multidisciplinary and mission oriented<!-- "" - sic! --> mass surveillance activities (for example [[INDECT]] and [http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88614_en.html HIDE]) were funded by the [[European Commission]]<ref>[http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/projects_en.html "FP7 Security Research"], Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS), European Commission, 3 September 2012. Retrieved 15 September 2013.</ref> in association with industrial partners.<ref>[http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/31/31198/1.html "The EU Security-Industrial Complex, an interview with Ben Hayes about his book ''NeoConOpticon'' "], Matthias Monroy, ''[[Telepolis]]'' (Heise Zeitschriften Verlag), 25 September 2009. Retrieved 15 September 2013.</ref><ref>[http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/neoconopticon-report.pdf ''NeoConOpticon — The EU Security-Industrial Complex''], Ben Hayes, Transnational Institute (TNI) and [[Statewatch]], 25 September 2009, 84 pages,{{ISSN|1756-851X}}. Retrieved 15 September 2013.</ref><ref>[http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/31/31176/1.html "Totalüberwachung der realen und virtuellen Räume"] {{in lang|de}} ("Total control of the real and virtual spaces"), Florian Rötzer, ''[[Telepolis]]'' (Heise Zeitschriften Verlag), 22 September 2009. Retrieved 15 September 2013. ([https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.heise.de%2Ftp%2Fartikel%2F31%2F31176%2F1.html&sandbox=1 English translation])</ref><ref>[ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/security/docs/towards-a-more-secure_en.pdf ''Towards a more secure society and increased industrial competitiveness: Security Research Projects under the 7th Framework Programme for Research'']{{Dead link|date=March 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, European Commission, May 2009, 100 pages. Retrieved 15 September 2013.</ref>
The INDECT Project ("Intelligent information system supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment")<ref name="INDECT project homepage">[http://www.indect-project.eu/ INDECT project homepage] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110108165259/http://www.indect-project.eu/ |date=8 January 2011 }}, AGH - University of Science and Technology (Poland). Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref> develops an intelligent urban environment observation system to register and exchange operational data for the automatic detection, recognition and intelligent processing of all information of [[abnormal behaviour]] or violence.<ref name="cordis.europa.eu">[http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=FP7_PROJ_EN&ACTION=D&DOC=4&CAT=PROJ&QUERY=011f30e52539:b685:00e1e967&RCN=89374 "INDECT: Intelligent information system supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment"], EU Research Projects, Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS), European Commission, 4 September 2013. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref><ref name="telegraph.co.uk">[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6210255/EU-funding-Orwellian-artificial-intelligence-plan-to-monitor-public-for-abnormal-behaviour.html "EU funding 'Orwellian' artificial intelligence plan to monitor public for 'abnormal behaviour' "], Ian Johnston, ''The Telegraph'' (UK), 19 September 2009. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref>

The main expected results of the INDECT project are:
* Trial of intelligent analysis of video and audio data for threat detection in urban environments,
* Creation of tools and technology for privacy and data protection during storage and transmission of information using quantum cryptography and new methods of digital watermarking,
* Performing computer-aided detection of threats and targeted crimes in Internet resources with privacy-protecting solutions,
* Construction of a search engine for rapid semantic search based on watermarking of content related to child pornography and human organ trafficking,
* Implementation of a distributed computer system that is capable of effective intelligent processing.

HIDE ("Homeland Security, Biometric Identification & Personal Detection Ethics")<ref>HIDE - "HOMELAND SECURITY, BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AND PERSONAL DETECTION ETHICS", Community Research and Development Information Service, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88614_en.html. Retrieved 17 July 2016</ref> was a research project funded by the European Commission within the scope of the [[Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development|Seventh RTD Framework Programme]] (FP7). The consortium, coordinated by Emilio Mordini,<ref>Mordini E. (2008), Nothing to Hide. Biometrics, Privacy and Private Sphere, in Schouten B. et al. (eds.): BIOID 2008, Biometrics and Identity Management, LNCS 5372, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 247–257. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-89991-4_27. Retrieved July, 17; 2016.</ref> explored the [[Ethics|ethical]] and [[privacy]] implications of [[biometrics]] and personal detection technologies, focusing on the continuum between personal detection, authentication, identification and mass surveillance.<ref>HIDE Project Overview, http://www.cssc.eu/public/FINAL%20BROCHURE.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210124235451/http://www.cssc.eu/public/FINAL%20BROCHURE.pdf |date=24 January 2021 }}. Retrieved 17 July 2016</ref>

===France===
{{Further |Bill on Intelligence}}
{{Expand section |date=May 2015}}

===Germany===
In 2002 German citizens were tipped off about wiretapping when a software error led to a phone number allocated to the [[German Secret Service]] being listed on mobile telephone bills.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/11/04/german_secret_service_taps_phones/ |title=German secret service taps phones, bills buggees |author=Tim Richardson |date=4 November 2002 |work=The Register |access-date=27 January 2011}}</ref>

===India===
{{Main |Mass surveillance in India}}
The Indian parliament passed the [[Information Technology Act]] of 2008 with no debate, giving the government fiat power to tap all communications without a court order or a warrant. Section 69 of the act states "Section 69 empowers the Central Government/State Government/ its authorized agency to intercept, monitor or decrypt any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource if it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence or for investigation of any offence."

India is setting up a national intelligence grid called [[NATGRID]],<ref>[http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=54679 "Centralised System to Monitor Communications"], reply by Shri [[Gurudas Kamat]], [[Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology]] in [[Rajya Sabha]], [[Press Information Bureau]], 26 November 2009. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref> which would be fully set up by May 2011 where each individual's data ranging from land records, Internet logs, air and rail PNR, phone records, gun records, driving license, property records, insurance, and income tax records would be available in real time and with no oversight.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/MHA-to-make-security-data-tamper-free/articleshow/5078546.cms |work=[[The Times of India]] |first1=Vishwa |last1=Mohan |agency=[[Times News Network|TNN]] |title=MHA to make security data tamper-free |date=2 October 2009 |access-date=17 September 2013}}</ref> With a UID from the [[Unique Identification Authority of India]] being given to every Indian from February 2011, the government would be able track people in real time. A national population registry of all citizens will be established by the 2011 census, during which fingerprints and iris scans would be taken along with GPS records of each household.<ref>[http://www.igovernment.in/site/india-to-prepare-npr-with-2011-census/ India to prepare NPR with 2011 Census] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120905052217/http://www.igovernment.in/site/india-to-prepare-npr-with-2011-census/ |date=5 September 2012 }}, iGovernment (9.9 Mediaworx), 24 April 2008. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref><ref>[http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/25ec.htm "Election Commission to use Census data, GPS to track voters"], [[Rediff]] (Delhi), 25 August 2008. Retrieved 17 September 2012.</ref>

As per the initial plan, access to the combined data will be given to 11 agencies, including the [[Research and Analysis Wing]], the [[Intelligence Bureau (India)|Intelligence Bureau]], the [[Enforcement Directorate]], the [[National Investigation Agency]], the [[Central Bureau of Investigation]], the [[Directorate of Revenue Intelligence]] and the [[Narcotics Control Bureau]].

Several states within India have already installed CCTV surveillance systems with face matching capabilities using biometrics in Aadhaar.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://tunein23.com/EN/?p=2757|title=Picture Intelligence Unit – Aadhaar Based Surveillance By Foreign Firms|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180202190150/http://tunein23.com/EN/?p=2757|archive-date=2018-02-02|url-status=dead}}</ref> Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are using information linked with Aadhaar across different agencies to create a 360-degree profile of a person, calling it the Integration Information Hub. Other states are now planning to follow this model.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/despite-govt-denials-states-building-databases-for-360-degree-profiles-of-citizens/story-qnSLHGyZIXiZiO4ce84UuO.html|title=Right to privacy: Data shows states using Aadhaar to build profiles of citizens|date=25 August 2017}}</ref>

===Iran===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in Iran}}
[[Iran]] is one of the five countries on Reporters Without Borders' March 2013 list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in naturally active efforts to news providers . The government runs or controls almost all of the country's institutions for regulating, managing or legislating on telecommunications. The Supreme Council for Cyberspace, which was headed by [[Mahmoud Ahmadinejad|President Ahmadinejad]], was established in March 2012 and now determines digital policy. The construction of a parallel "Iranian Internet", with a high connection speed but fully monitored and censored, is almost complete.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

The tools used by the Iranian authorities to monitor and control the Internet include data interception tools capable of [[Deep Packet Inspection]]. Interception products from leading Chinese companies such as [[ZTE]] and [[Huawei]] are in use. The products provided by Huawei to [[Mobin Net]], the leading national provider of mobile broadband, can be used to analyze email content, track browsing history and block access to sites. The products that ZTA sold to the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran]] (TCI) offer similar services plus the possibility of monitoring the mobile network. European companies are the source of other spying and data analysis tools. Products designed by [[Ericsson]] and [[Nokia Solutions and Networks|Nokia Siemens Networks]] (later Trovicor) are in use. These companies sold [[Short Message Service|SMS]] interception and user location products to Mobile Communication Company of Iran and [[Irancell]], Iran's two biggest mobile phone companies, in 2009 and they were used to identify Iranian citizens during the [[2009–10 Iranian election protests|post-election uprising]] in 2009. The use of Israeli surveillance devices has also been detected in Iran. The network traffic management and surveillance device NetEnforcer was provided by Israel to Denmark and then resold to Iran. Similarly, US equipment has found its way to Iran via the Chinese company ZTE.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

===Malaysia===

In July 2018, the Malaysian police announced the creation of the Malaysian Intercept Crimes Against Children Unit (icacu) that is equipped with real-time mass internet surveillance software developed in the United States and is tasked with the monitoring of all Malaysian internet users, with a focus on pornography and child pornography. The system creates a "data library" of users which includes details such as IP addresses, websites, locations, duration and frequency of use and files uploaded and downloaded.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.malaymail.com/s/1650214/watching-porn-cops-now-have-their-eyes-on-you | title=Watching porn? Cops now have their eyes on you &#124; Malay Mail}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.nst.com.my/news/exclusive/2018/07/388926/exclusive-police-will-know-if-you-watch-porn |title = &#91;Exclusive&#93; Police will know if you watch porn|date = 9 July 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| url=https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2018/07/20/respect-privacy-and-no-to-monitoring-of-internet-usage-or-activity-in-malaysia-say-asean-ngos/| title=Respect privacy and no to monitoring of internet usage or activity in Malaysia, say ASEAN NGOs| date=20 July 2018| access-date=16 August 2018| archive-date=20 September 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180920221800/https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2018/07/20/respect-privacy-and-no-to-monitoring-of-internet-usage-or-activity-in-malaysia-say-asean-ngos/| url-status=dead}}</ref>

===Mexico===
After struggling with drug trafficking and criminal groups for decades Mexico has been strengthening their military mass surveillance. Approximately half of the population in Mexico does not support democracy as a form of government, and believe an authoritarian system is better if social matters are solved through it.<ref>Arteaga, Nelson. 2017. Mexico: Internal security, surveillance, and authoritarianism. Surveillance & Society 15(3/4): 491-495.</ref> The relevance of these political beliefs may make it easier for mass surveillance to spread within the country. "This does not necessarily mean the end of democratic institutions as a whole—such as free elections or the permanence of critical mass media—but it means strengthening the mechanisms for exercising power that exclude dialogue, transparency and social agreement."<ref>Arteaga, Nelson. 2017. Mexico: Internal security, surveillance, and authoritarianism. Surveillance & Society 15(3/4): 491-495.(Artega, 494)</ref> Developing intelligence agencies has been on Mexico's radar for a while for means of security.

===Netherlands===
According to a 2004 report, the government of the Netherlands carries out more clandestine wire-taps and intercepts than any country, per capita, in the world.<ref name="Italy and the Netherlands top wiretaps chart. EDRi-gram 15 July 2004 from EDRI.org">[https://edri.org/edrigramnumber2-14wiretap/ "Italy and the Netherlands top wiretap chart"], Digital Civil Rights in Europe, EDRI-gram Number 2.14, 15 July 2004. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref> The Dutch military intelligence service MIVD operates a satellite ground station to intercept foreign satellite links and also a facility to eavesdrop on foreign high-frequency radio traffic.
An example of mass surveillance carried out by corporations in the Netherlands is an initiative started by five Dutch banks (ABN AMRO, ING, Rabobank, Triodos Bank and de Volksbank). In July 2020 these five banks<ref>[https://www.nvb.nl/english/transaction-monitoring-netherlands-a-unique-step-in-the-fight-against-money-laundering-and-the-financing-of-terrorism/ "Press release of The Dutch Banking Association, 8 July 2020"]</ref> have decided to establish Transaction Monitoring Netherlands (TMNL) in the collective fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.<ref>[https://tmnl.nl/summary-eng/ "Website TMNL"]</ref> The goal of TMNL-organization is to gather all transaction information provided by Dutch banks in a centralized database to enable full-scale collective transaction monitoring. Preparations have been started but the actual monitoring by TMNL can start after an amendment of the Dutch Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act.

===North Korea===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in North Korea}}
Having attained the nickname 'surveillance state', North Korea's government has complete control over all forms of telecommunications and Internet.  It is routine to be sent to a prison camp for communicating with the outside world. The government enforces restrictions around the types of appliances North Koreans may own in their home, in case radio or TV sets pick up signals from nearby South Korea, China and Russia.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.amnesty.org.uk/north-korea-surveillance-state-prison-camp-internet-phone-technology | title=North Korea, the surveillance state}}</ref> There is no attempt to mask the way this government actively spies on their citizens. In North Korea, an increasing number of citizens do have smartphones. However, these devices are heavily controlled and are being used to censor and observe everything North Koreans do on their phones. Reuters reported in 2015 that Koryolink, North Korea's official mobile phone network, has around 3 million subscribers in a country of 24 million.{{citation needed|date=May 2020}} Obviously, in order to have digital data to draw from, the citizens must have access to phones and other things online.

===Russia===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in Russia}}[[File:Свидетельство о государственной регистрации программы для ЭВМ - "Камертон".jpg|alt=Certificate of state registration of the "monitoring, control, tracking the target of ground vehicles" - "СAMERTON".|thumb|Certificate of state registration of the "monitoring, control, tracking the target of ground vehicles" – '''''"СAMERTON"''''']]The [[SORM]] (and SORM-2) laws enable complete monitoring of any [[communication]], [[Telecommunication|electronic]] or traditional, by eight state agencies, without warrant. These laws seem to be in conflict with Article 23 of the [[Constitution of Russia]] which states:<ref name="1993const">[http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm "Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man And Citizen"], ''Constitution of Russia''. Retrieved 17 September 2013.</ref>
<blockquote>
# Everyone shall have the right to the inviolability of private life, personal and family secrets, the protection of honour and good name.
# Everyone shall have the right to privacy of correspondence, of telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other messages. Limitations of this right shall be allowed only by court decision.
</blockquote>
[[File:Благодарность Отдела МВД Российской Федерации по Волховскому району, компании ПНИР за создание системы "Камертон".jpg|alt=Gratitude of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Volkhov region of the organization Perspective Scientific Research Development for the creation of the "CAMERTON" system.|thumb|Gratitude of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Volkhov region of the organization Perspective Scientific Research Development for the creation of the '''''"CAMERTON"''''' system]]
In 2015, the [[European Court of Human Rights|European Court for Human Rights]] ruled that the legislation violated [[Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights]] (''[[Zakharov v. Russia]]''). 

[[CAMERTON - mass system surveillance in Russia|СAMERTON]]: Is a global vehicle tracking system, control and tracking, identification of probable routes and places of the most frequent appearance of a particular vehicle, integrated with a distributed network of radar complexes of photo-video fixation and road surveillance camera.<ref>{{Cite web|last="What is "professionalitet", how it will be useful for a student, a specialist and the labor market"|title=Website about business and economics (in Russian)|url=https://wall.wayxar.com/other/chto_takoe_professionalitet_i_chem_on_budet_polezen_studentu_spetsialistu_i_rynku_truda|url-status=live|access-date=2021-10-17|website=Wall Wayxar (Moscow)|language=ru}}</ref> Developed and implemented by the [https://companies.rbc.ru/id/1157847414284-ooo-obschestvo-s-ogranichennoj-otvetstvennostyu-perspektivnyie-nauchno-issledovatelskie-razrabotki/ "Advanced Scientific - Research Projects"] enterprise St. Petersburg.<ref>{{Cite web|last="Digital-Report" - information and analytical magazin|date=2021-08-12|title="Saboteur developers: pests at work and how to find them"|url=https://digital-report.ru/razrabotchiki-diversanty-vrediteli-na-rabote-i-kak-ih-najti/|url-status=live|access-date=2021-10-17|website=Digital Report|language=ru-RU}}</ref> Within the framework of the practical use of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, it has made it possible to identify and solve grave and especially grave crimes, the system is also operated by other state services and departments;

===Singapore===
[[Singapore]] is known as a city of sensors. Singapore's surveillance structure spreads widely from [[closed-circuit television]] (CCTV) in public areas even around the neighbourhood, internet monitoring/traffic monitoring and to the use of surveillance [[metadata]] for government initiatives. In Singapore, SIM card registration is mandatory even for prepaid card. Singapore's government have the rights to access communication data. Singapore's largest telecompany, [[Singtel]], has close relations to the government and Singapore's laws are broadly phrased to allow the government to obtain sensitive data such as text-messages, email, call logs, and web surfing history from its people without the need for court permission.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.techinasia.com/singapore-advanced-surveillance-state-citizens-mind | title=Tech in Asia - Connecting Asia's startup ecosystem}}</ref>

The installation of mass surveillance cameras in Singapore is an effort to act as a deterrence not only for terror attacks<ref name="more-surveillance">{{Cite news | url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/more-surveillance-cameras-as-deterrent | title=More surveillance cameras as deterrent| newspaper=The Straits Times| date=18 March 2016| last1=Sim| first1=Royston}}</ref> but also for public security such as loan sharks, illegal parking, and more.<ref>{{Cite news | url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/network-of-cctv-cameras-proving-effective | title=Network of CCTV cameras proving effective| newspaper=The Straits Times| date=8 March 2016| last1=Heng| first1=Janice}}</ref> As part of Singapore's [[Smart Nation]] initiative to build a network of sensors to collect and connect data from city life (including the citizen's movement), the Singapore government rolled out 1000 sensors ranging from computer chips to surveillance cameras,<ref>{{Cite news | url=https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/04/singapore-city-of-sensors/523392/ | title=Seeking Privacy in a City of Sensors| newspaper=Bloomberg.com| date=21 April 2017}}</ref> to track almost everything in Singapore from air quality to public safety in 2014.<ref>{{Cite news | url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/1000-sensors-to-be-rolled-out-in-singapore-as-part-of-smart-nation-plan | title=1,000 sensors to be rolled out in Singapore as part of 'smart nation' plan| newspaper=The Straits Times| date=10 October 2014| last1=Tham| first1=Irene}}</ref>

In 2016, in a bid to increase security, the [[Singapore Police Force]] installed 62,000 police cameras in 10,000 [[Housing and Development Board]] (HDB) blocks covering the lifts and multi-storey car parks.<ref>{{Cite news | url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/installation-of-62000-police-cameras-in-10000-hdb-blocks-multi-storey-carparks-complete | title=Installation of 62,000 police cameras in 10,000 HDB blocks, multi-storey carparks complete| newspaper=The Straits Times| date=11 July 2016}}</ref> With rising security concerns, the number of CCTV cameras in public areas such as monitoring of the public transport system and commercial/ government buildings in Singapore is set to increase.<ref name="more-surveillance"/>

In 2018, the Singapore government would be rolling out new and more advanced surveillance systems. Starting with Singapore's maritime borders, new panoramic electro-optic sensors will be put in place on the north and south coasts, monitoring a 360-degree view of the area.<ref>{{Cite news | url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/bevy-of-cameras-high-tech-sensors-to-secure-shoreline | title=Bevy of cameras, high-tech sensors to secure shoreline| newspaper=The Straits Times| date=18 March 2016| last1=Cheong| first1=Danson}}</ref> A tethered [[unmanned aerial vehicle]] (UAV) will also be operational, which can be used during search and rescue operations including hostage situations and public order incidents.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/new-drones-command-vehicles-to-help-police-fight-crime-better-9819786 |title=New drones, command vehicles to help police fight crime better |date=31 December 2017 |first=Aqil Haziq |last=Mahmud |work=Channel NewsAsia |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20171231151841/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/new-drones-command-vehicles-to-help-police-fight-crime-better-9819786 |archivedate=2017-12-31}}</ref>

===Spain===
According to a 2017 report by [[Privacy International]], Spain may be part of a group of 21 European countries that is withholding information, also known as data retention.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy-briefing/735/report-national-data-retention-laws-cjeus-tele-2watson-judgment|title=Report on the National Data Retention Laws Since The CJEU's Tele-2/Watson Judgment|date=1 September 2017|website=Privacy International|access-date=17 April 2018|archive-date=9 July 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190709101221/https://www.privacyinternational.org/advocacy-briefing/735/report-national-data-retention-laws-cjeus-tele-2watson-judgment|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 2014, many defense lawyers tried to overturn multiple cases that used mass storage as their evidence to convict, according to the [[European Agency for Fundamental Rights]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/information-society-privacy-and-data-protection/data-retention#Slovenia|title=Data retention across the EU|date=16 December 2015|work=European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights|access-date=2018-04-29|language=en}}</ref>

===Sweden===
Prior to 2009, the [[National Defence Radio Establishment (Sweden)|National Defence Radio Establishment]] (FRA) was limited to wireless [[signals intelligence]] (SIGINT), although it was left largely unregulated.<ref>{{cite web|title=SOU 2003:30|page=154|quote=Det har således i svensk rätt bedömts att det inte finns något rättsligt skydd för den enskildes integritet mot avlyssning eller inhämtning av signaltrafik som befordras trådlöst}}</ref> In December 2009, new legislation went into effect, allowing the FRA to monitor cable bound signals passing the Swedish border.<ref name=turerna>{{cite news|last=Hernadi|first=Alexandra|title=I morgon börjar FRA-lagen gälla|newspaper=Svenska Dagbladet|date=30 November 2009|url=http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/i-morgon-borjar-fra-lagen-galla_3868431.svd|publisher=[[SvD]]|access-date=10 March 2014|language=sv}}</ref> Communications service providers are legally required, under confidentiality, to transfer cable communications crossing Swedish borders to specific "interaction points", where data may be accessed after a court order.<ref>{{cite web |title=Prop. 2006/07:63 |url=http://www.regeringen.se/download/2ee1ba0a.pdf?major=1&minor=78367&cn=attachme }}{{Dead link|date=March 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

The FRA has been contested since the change in its legislation, mainly because of the public perception the change would enable mass surveillance.<ref>{{cite news|last=Bjurbo|first=Peter|title=FRA-spaning inte så stor som framställts|url=https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=2184064|newspaper=[[Sveriges Radio]]|date=10 July 2008|access-date=10 March 2014|language=sv}}</ref> The FRA categorically deny this allegation,<ref name="turerna" /><ref>{{cite web|title=FRA Påståenden och klargöranden|publisher=FRA|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070611040026/http://www.fra.se/omfra_faq_lag.shtml|archive-date=11 June 2007|url=http://www.fra.se/omfra_faq_lag.shtml|language=sv|year=2009}}</ref> as they are not allowed to initialize any surveillance on their own,<ref name=datainspektionen>{{cite web|title=Datainspektionens redovisning av regeringsuppdraget Fö2009/355/SUND|url=http://www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/beslut/2010-12-07-fra.pdf|publisher=The Swedish Data Inspection Board|access-date=10 March 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140603163744/http://www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/beslut/2010-12-07-fra.pdf|archive-date=3 June 2014|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and has no direct access to communication lines.<ref>{{cite web|title=SFS 2008:717|url=https://lagen.nu/2008:717#P4aS1}}</ref> All SIGINT has to be authorized by a [[The Defence Intelligence Court (Sweden)|special court]] and meet a set of narrow requirements, something [[Minister for Defence (Sweden)|Minister for Defence]] [[Sten Tolgfors]] have been quoted as saying, "should render the debate on mass surveillance invalid".<ref name="limits">{{cite web|last=Sjögren |first=Per-Anders |title=Alliansen enig om stora ändringar i FRA-lag |url=http://rod.se/alliansen-enig-om-stora-%C3%A4ndringar-i-fra-lag/ |publisher=Riksdag & Departement |access-date=10 March 2014 |language=sv |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140310123656/http://rod.se/alliansen-enig-om-stora-%C3%A4ndringar-i-fra-lag/ |archive-date=10 March 2014 }}</ref><ref name=villkor>{{cite news|last=Bynert|first=Simon|title=Militärt hot villkor för FRA-spaning|newspaper=Svenska Dagbladet|date=26 September 2008|url=http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/militart-hot-villkor-for-fra-spaning_1788753.svd|publisher=[[SvD]]|access-date=10 March 2014|language=sv}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Alliansen enig om stärkt integritet, tydligare reglering och förbättrad kontroll i kompletteringar till signalspaningslagen |url=http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10911/a/112332 |publisher=Regeringen |access-date=10 March 2014 |language=sv |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140310123055/http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10911/a/112332 |archive-date=10 March 2014 }}</ref> Due to the architecture of Internet backbones in the Nordic area, a large portion of Norwegian and Finnish traffic will also be affected by the Swedish wiretapping.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Anarcho-primitivism {{!}} political and ethical movement|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/anarcho-primitivism|access-date=2020-12-12|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|language=en}}</ref>

===Syria===
[[Syria]] is one of the five countries on Reporters Without Borders' March 2013 list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in active, intrusive surveillance of news providers, resulting in grave violations of freedom of information and human rights. Syria has stepped up its web censorship and cyber-monitoring as the [[Syrian civil war|country's civil war]] has intensified. At least 13 [[Blue Coat Systems|Blue Coat proxy servers]] are in use, [[Skype]] calls are intercepted, and [[Social engineering (security)|social engineering techniques]], [[phishing]], and [[malware]] attacks are all in use.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

===United Arab Emirates===
In October 2016, ''[[The Intercept]]'' released a report detailing the experience of an Italian security researcher Simone Margaritelli, of allegedly being hired for mass surveillance operations run by [[United Arab Emirates]]. According to Margaritelli, he was called for an interview with the [[Abu Dhabi]]-based [[cybersecurity]] firm called [[DarkMatter (Emirati company)|DarkMatter]]. Margaritelli says he declined the offer and instead wrote a blog post titled "How the United Arab Emirates Intelligence Tried to Hire Me to Spy on Its People". In response to The Intercept inquiries, DarkMatter responded by stating: "No one from DarkMatter or its subsidiaries have ever interviewed Mr. Margaritelli." Kevin Healy, director of communications for DarkMatter, wrote in an email responding to The Intercept that the man Margaritelli says interviewed him was previously only an advisory consultant to DarkMatter and is currently no longer an advisor to the company. Dark Matter responded by saying "While we respect an author's right to express a personal opinion, we do not view the content in question as credible, and therefore have no further comment."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://theintercept.com/2016/10/24/darkmatter-united-arab-emirates-spies-for-hire/|title=Spies for Hire|access-date=24 October 2016|website=The Intercept|date=24 October 2016}}</ref>

In January 2019, [[Reuters]] released a detailed account of a 2014 state-surveillance operation – dubbed as Project Raven – led by the [[United Arab Emirates]] with the help of former [[National Security Agency|NSA]] officials like Lori Stroud, an ex-NSA cyberspy. [[Counter-terrorism]] strategy was the primary motive of setting up the unit. However, soon the project began being used as a [[surveillance]] program to spy on rival leaders, critical [[dissidents]] and [[journalists]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-raven/|title=Inside the UAE's secret hacking team of American mercenaries|access-date=30 January 2019|website=Reuters}}</ref>

In December 2019, [[Google Play Store]] and [[App Store (iOS)|Apple App Store]] removed an [[Emiratis|Emirati]] messaging application called [[ToTok (app)|ToTok]] following allegations that it was a state surveillance application, according to ''[[The New York Times]]'' report.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50890846|title=Google and Apple remove alleged UAE spy app ToTok|work=BBC News|date=23 December 2019|access-date=23 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politics/totok-app-uae.html|title=It Seemed Like a Popular Chat App. It's Secretly a Spy Tool.|access-date=22 December 2019|website=The New York Times|date=22 December 2019|last1=Mazzetti|first1=Mark|last2=Perlroth|first2=Nicole|last3=Bergman|first3=Ronen}}</ref> The application's privacy policy clearly stated that it may share personal data of the users with "regulatory agencies, law enforcement, and other lawful access requests". The allegations were denied by the co-founders of ToTok, Giacomo Ziani and Long Ruan, respectively. The application was restored on Google Play Store later on.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnet.com/news/totok-returns-to-google-play-store-after-accusations-of-spying/|title=ToTok returns to Google Play Store after accusations of spying |date=January 6, 2020 |first=Oscar |last=Gonzalez |access-date=6 January 2020|website=CNET}}</ref>

In July 2020, the United Arab Emirates came under renewed questions about mass surveillance amidst the [[COVID-19 pandemic|coronavirus outbreak]]. Experts highlighted that the country has one of the highest per capita concentrations of surveillance cameras in the world. In a statement, the Emirati government acknowledged that cameras are used to counter the threat of terrorism and have helped the country rank as one of the safest countries in the world.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apnews.com/e70e359d46391672a7a88f254cf9025b|title=Virus projects renew questions about UAE's mass surveillance|access-date=9 July 2020|website=Associated Press}}</ref>

===United Kingdom===
{{Main |Mass surveillance in the United Kingdom}}

State surveillance in the [[United Kingdom]] has formed part of the public consciousness since the 19th century. The postal espionage crisis of 1844 sparked the first panic over the privacy of citizens.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/surveillance-privacy-and-history|title=Surveillance, privacy and history|last=Vincent|first=David|date=1 October 2013|website=History & Policy|publisher=History & Policy|access-date=27 July 2016}}</ref> However, in the 20th century, electronic surveillance capabilities grew out of wartime [[signal intelligence]] and pioneering [[code breaking]].<ref>{{cite news|title=How the British and Americans started listening in|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35491822|access-date=24 February 2016|work=BBC|date=8 February 2016}}</ref> In 1946, the [[Government Communications Headquarters]] (GCHQ) was formed. The United Kingdom and the United States signed the bilateral [[UKUSA Agreement]] in 1948. It was later broadened to include Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as cooperation with several "third-party" nations. This became the cornerstone of Western intelligence gathering and the "[[Special Relationship]]" between the UK and the US.<ref name="timecoldwar">{{cite magazine|last=Adam White|title=How a Secret Spy Pact Helped Win the Cold War|magazine=Time|url=http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2000262,00.html|date=29 June 2010}}</ref>

After the growth of the Internet and development of the [[World Wide Web]], a series of [[2013 Global surveillance disclosure|media reports in 2013]] revealed more recent programs and techniques involving GCHQ, such as [[Tempora]].<ref>{{cite news|title=US and Britain team up on mass surveillance|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/22/nsa-leaks-britain-us-surveillance|access-date=13 May 2015|newspaper=The Guardian|date=22 June 2013}}</ref>

The use of these capabilities is controlled by laws made in the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|UK Parliament]]. In particular, access to the content of private messages (that is, interception of a communication) must be authorized by a warrant signed by a [[Secretary of State (United Kingdom)|Secretary of State]].<ref>{{cite news|title=The Andrew Marr Show Interview: Theresa May, MP Home Secretary|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/2311201402.pdf|access-date=6 December 2014|publisher=BBC|date=23 November 2014|quote=Well I guess what he’s talking about is the fact that for certain aspects and certain of the more intrusive measures that our security service and police have available to them – i.e. Intercept, intercepting people’s telephones and some other intrusive measures – the decision is taken by the Secretary of State, predominantly me. A significant part of my job is looking at these warrants and signing these warrants. I think it’s ... Some people argue that should be to judges....I think it’s very important that actually those decisions are being taken by somebody who is democratically accountable to the public. I think that’s an important part of our system. I think it’s a strength of our system.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The Law|url=http://www.gchq.gov.uk/how_we_work/running_the_business/oversight/Pages/The-law.aspx|publisher=GCHQ|access-date=17 December 2013|archive-date=13 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200113191839/https://www.gchq.gov.uk/how_we_work/running_the_business/oversight/Pages/The-law.aspx|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Statement on GCHQ's Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM Programme|url=https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20130717_ISC_statement_GCHQ.pdf|publisher=Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament|access-date=17 December 2013|date=17 July 2013}}</ref> In addition European Union [[Data Protection Directive|data privacy]] law applies in UK law. The UK exhibits governance and safeguards as well as use of electronic surveillance.<ref>{{cite web|title=Other safeguards and oversight|url=http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=27|publisher=The Investigatory Powers Tribunal|access-date=6 February 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206141103/http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=27|archive-date=6 February 2015|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Intelligence and Security Committee open evidence session
|url=http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2013/november-/isc-open-evidence-session/|publisher=UK Parliament|access-date=18 December 2013|date=7 November 2013}}; {{cite news|title=Spy chiefs public hearing: as it happened|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10432629/Spy-chiefs-public-hearing-as-it-happened.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10432629/Spy-chiefs-public-hearing-as-it-happened.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=18 December 2013|newspaper=The Telegraph|date=7 November 2013}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Britain's spy chiefs will be questioned in public for the first time, under radical reforms of the way Parliament monitors the intelligence agencies|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9669262/Top-spooks-to-be-quizzed-in-public.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9669262/Top-spooks-to-be-quizzed-in-public.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=18 December 2013|newspaper=The Telegraph|date=10 November 2012}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

The [[Investigatory Powers Tribunal]], a judicial oversight body for the intelligence agencies, ruled in December 2014 that the legislative framework in the United Kingdom does not breach the [[European Convention on Human Rights]].<ref name=BBC20141206>{{cite news|title=GCHQ does not breach human rights, judges rule|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30345801|access-date=6 December 2014|publisher=BBC|date=5 December 2014}}</ref><ref name=IPT20141205>{{cite web|title=IPT rejects assertions of mass surveillance |url=http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/IPT-rejects-assertions-of-mass-surveillance.aspx |publisher=GCHQ |access-date=7 February 2015 |date=5 December 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206232713/http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/IPT-rejects-assertions-of-mass-surveillance.aspx |archive-date=6 February 2015 }}</ref><ref name=refIPTList>{{cite web|title=List of judgments |url=http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=8 |publisher=Investigatory Powers Tribunal |access-date=7 February 2015 |date=5 December 2014 |quote=1. A declaration that the regime governing the soliciting, receiving, storing and transmitting by UK authorities of private communications of individuals located in the UK which have been obtained by US authorities pursuant to Prism and/or Upstream does not contravene Articles 8 or 10 ECHR. 2. A declaration that the regime in respect of interception under ss8(4), 15 and 16 of the Regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000 does not contravene Articles 8 or 10 ECHR and does not give rise to unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 14, read together with Articles 8 and/or 10 of the ECHR. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206211011/http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=8 |archive-date=6 February 2015 }}</ref> However, the Tribunal stated in February 2015 that one particular aspect, the [[data sharing]] arrangement that allowed UK Intelligence services to request data from the US surveillance programs [[PRISM (surveillance program)|Prism]] and [[Upstream collection|Upstream]], had been in contravention of human rights law prior to this until two paragraphs of additional information, providing details about the procedures and safeguards, were disclosed to the public in December 2014.<ref>{{cite web|title=IPT Ruling on Interception |url=http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/IPT-Ruling-on-Interception-Feb-2014.aspx |publisher=GCHQ |access-date=6 February 2015 |date=6 February 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206205536/http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_features/Pages/IPT-Ruling-on-Interception-Feb-2014.aspx |archive-date=6 February 2015 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=GCHQ censured over sharing of internet surveillance data with US|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31164451|access-date=6 February 2015|publisher=BBC|date=6 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful 'for seven years'|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillance-unlawful-court-nsa|access-date=6 February 2015|newspaper=The Guardian|date=6 February 2015}}</ref>

In its December 2014 ruling, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the legislative framework in the United Kingdom does not permit mass surveillance and that while GCHQ collects and analyses data in bulk, it does not practice mass surveillance.<ref name=BBC20141206 /><ref name=IPT20141205 /><ref name=refIPTList /> A report on Privacy and Security published by the [[Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament]] also came to this view, although it found past shortcomings in oversight and said the legal framework should be simplified to improve transparency.<ref>{{cite web|title=UK surveillance 'lacks transparency', ISC report says|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31845338|publisher=BBC|access-date=14 March 2015|date=12 March 2015}}</ref><ref name=ISC2015March>{{cite web|title=Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework|url=http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/12march2015|publisher=Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament|access-date=14 March 2015|date=12 March 2015|archive-date=16 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150316093647/http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/12march2015|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Intelligence and security committee report: the key findings|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/intelligence-security-committee-report-key-findings|access-date=14 March 2015|newspaper=The Guardian|date=12 March 2015}}</ref> This view is supported by independent reports from the [[Interception of Communications Commissioner]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Statement by the Interception of Communications Commissioner's Office (IOCCO) on the publication of the Interception of Communications Commissioner's Report 2014|url=http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2015%20Press%20Release%20Final.pdf|access-date=14 March 2015|date=12 March 2015|postscript=none|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402112439/http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/2015%20Press%20Release%20Final.pdf|archive-date=2 April 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}; {{cite web|title=Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner|url=http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/IOCCO%20Report%20March%202015%20(Web).pdf|access-date=14 March 2015|date=March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150321204956/http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/IOCCO%20Report%20March%202015%20(Web).pdf|archive-date=21 March 2015|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref> However, notable civil liberties groups continue to express strong views to the contrary and plan to appeal the ruling to the [[European Court of Human Rights]],<ref>{{cite news|title=UK surveillance laws need total overhaul, says landmark report|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/12/uk-surveillance-laws-need-total-overhaul-says-landmark-report-edward-snowden|access-date=14 March 2015|newspaper=The Guardian|date=12 March 2015}}</ref> while others have criticised these viewpoints in turn.<ref name=refTimes20150313>{{cite news|title=Civil liberty campaigners attacked for saying terror attack is "price worth paying" to prevent mass snooping|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11468060/Civil-liberty-campaigners-attacked-for-saying-terror-attack-is-price-worth-paying-to-prevent-mass-snooping.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11468060/Civil-liberty-campaigners-attacked-for-saying-terror-attack-is-price-worth-paying-to-prevent-mass-snooping.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=14 November 2015|work=The Telegraph|date=12 March 2015|postscript=none}}{{cbignore}}; {{cite news|title=GCHQ doesn't need any lectures from Liberty|url=http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/thunderer/article4380539.ece|newspaper=The Times|access-date=14 March 2015|date=13 March 2015|last1=Carlile|first1=Alex}}</ref>

[[File:Menwith-hill-radomes.jpg|thumb|right|[[RAF Menwith Hill]], a large site in the United Kingdom, part of [[ECHELON]] and the [[UKUSA Agreement]]]]

The [[Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000]] (RIP or RIPA) is a significant piece of legislation that granted and regulated the powers of public bodies to carry out surveillance and investigation.<ref name=RIPA2000>[http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/introduction "Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000"], 2000 Chapter 23, UK Government Legislation. Retrieved 28 September 2013.</ref> In 2002 the UK government announced plans to extend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act so that at least 28 government departments would be given powers to access [[metadata]] about citizens' web, e-mail, telephone and fax records, without a warrant and without a subject's knowledge.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2038036.stm |work=BBC News |title='Massive abuse' of privacy feared |date=11 June 2002 |access-date=5 April 2010}}</ref>

The [[Protection of Freedoms Act 2012]] includes several provisions related to controlling and restricting the collection, storage, retention, and use of information in government databases.<ref name=POFAct2012>[https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protection-of-freedoms-bill "Protection of Freedoms Bill"], Home Office, 11 February 2011. Retrieved 28 September 2013.</ref>

Supported by all three major political parties, the UK Parliament passed the [[Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014|Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act]] in July 2014 to ensure police and security services retain existing powers to access phone and Internet records.<ref>{{cite news|title=Emergency data law clears Commons|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-of-commons-28320473|access-date=27 September 2014|publisher=BBC|date=16 July 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Data Retention Bill set to become law|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-of-lords-28349828|access-date=27 September 2014|publisher=BBC|date=17 July 2014}}</ref>

This was superseded by the [[Investigatory Powers Act 2016]], a comprehensive statute which made public a number of previously secret powers (equipment interference, bulk retention of metadata, intelligence agency use of bulk personal datasets), and enables the Government to require internet service providers and mobile phone companies to maintain records of (but not the content of) customers' Internet connections for 12 months. In addition, it created new safeguards, including a requirement for judges to approve the warrants authorised by a Secretary of State before they come into force.<ref>{{cite news|title=Details of UK website visits 'to be stored for year'|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34715872|access-date=10 November 2015|work=BBC|date=4 November 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Investigatory powers bill: the key points|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/investigatory-powers-bill-the-key-points|access-date=10 November 2015|work=The Guardian|date=4 November 2015}}</ref> The Act was informed by two reports by [[David Anderson (barrister)|David Anderson QC]], the UK's [[Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation]]: A Question of Trust (2015)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-question-of-trust-report-of-the-investigatory-powers-review|title=A question of trust: report of the investigatory powers review - GOV.UK|website=www.gov.uk|language=en|access-date=2017-07-06}}</ref> and the report of his Bulk Powers Review (2016),<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-powers-bill-bulk-powers-review|title=Investigatory Powers Bill: bulk powers review - GOV.UK|website=www.gov.uk|language=en|access-date=2017-07-06}}</ref> which contains a detailed appraisal (with 60 case studies) of the operational case for the powers often characterised as mass surveillance. It may yet require amendment as a consequence of legal cases brought before the [[Court of Justice of the European Union]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.daqc.co.uk/2017/04/11/cjeu-judgment-in-watson/|title=CJEU judgment in Watson/Tele2|last=David Anderson|date=11 April 2017|website=David Anderson QC Lawyer London UK|access-date=2017-07-06}}</ref> and the [[European Court of Human Rights]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/992|title=10 Human Rights Organisations v. United Kingdom {{!}} Privacy International|website=www.privacyinternational.org|language=en|access-date=2017-07-06}}</ref>

Many advanced nation-states have implemented laws that partially protect citizens from unwarranted intrusion, such as the [[Human Rights Act 1998]], the [[Data Protection Act 1998]], (updated as the [[Data Protection Act 2018]], to include the [[General Data Protection Regulation]]), and the [[Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003]] in the United Kingdom, and laws that require a formal warrant before private data may be gathered by a government.

The vast majority of video surveillance cameras in the UK are not operated by government bodies, but by private individuals or companies, especially to monitor the interiors of shops and businesses. According to 2011 [[Freedom of Information Act 2000|Freedom of Information Act]] requests, the total number of local government operated CCTV cameras was around 52,000 over the entirety of the UK.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Price of Privacy: How local authorities spent £515m on CCTV in four years|url=http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/files/priceofprivacy/Price_of_privacy_2012.pdf|publisher=Big Brother Watch|access-date=4 February 2015|date=February 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923185058/http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/files/priceofprivacy/Price_of_privacy_2012.pdf|archive-date=23 September 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> The prevalence of video surveillance in the UK is often overstated due to unreliable estimates being requoted;<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/society/factcheck+how+many+cctv+cameras/2291167 |title=FactCheck: how many CCTV cameras? - Channel 4 News |publisher=Channel4.com |access-date=8 May 2009 |archive-date=11 May 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100511054941/http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/society/factcheck+how+many+cctv+cameras/2291167 |url-status=dead }}</ref> for example one report in 2002 extrapolated from a very small sample to estimate the number of cameras in the UK at 4.2 million (of which 500,000 in London).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf |title=CCTV in London |access-date=22 July 2009}}</ref> More reliable estimates put the number of private and local government operated cameras in the United Kingdom at around 1.85 million in 2011.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.cctvusergroup.com/art.php?art=94 |title=How many cameras are there? |publisher=CCTV User Group |date=18 June 2008 |access-date=8 May 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081023191646/http://www.cctvusergroup.com/art.php?art=94 |archive-date=23 October 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

===United States===
{{Main|Mass surveillance in the United States}}
{{NSA surveillance}}

Historically, mass surveillance was used as part of wartime censorship to control communications that could damage the war effort and aid the enemy. For example, during the world wars, every international telegram from or to the United States sent through companies such as [[Western Union]] was reviewed by the US military. After the wars were over, surveillance continued in programs such as the [[Black Chamber]] following World War I and [[Project SHAMROCK|project Shamrock]] following World War II.<ref>[[James Bamford]] (2008), ''[[The Shadow Factory]]'', Doubleday, {{ISBN|0-385-52132-4}}, Chapter 'Shamrock', especially pg. 163.</ref> [[COINTELPRO]] projects conducted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) between 1956 and 1971 targeted various "subversive" organizations, including peaceful anti-war and racial equality activists such as [[Albert Einstein]] and [[Martin Luther King Jr.]]

Billions of dollars per year are spent, by agencies such as the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI), to develop, purchase, implement, and operate systems such as [[Carnivore (FBI)|Carnivore]], [[Echelon (signals intelligence)|ECHELON]], and [[NarusInsight]] to intercept and analyze the immense amount of data that traverses the Internet and telephone system every day.<ref name="zdnet-fbi">{{cite news |url=http://www.zdnet.com/news/fbi-turns-to-broad-new-wiretap-method/151059  |title=FBI turns to broad new wiretap method |last=McCullagh |first=Declan |date=30 January 2007 |work=ZDNet News|access-date=13 March 2009}}</ref>

Under the [[Mail Isolation Control and Tracking]] program, the U.S. Postal Service photographs the exterior of every piece of paper mail that is processed in the United States – about 160 billion pieces in 2012. The U.S. Postmaster General stated that the system is primarily used for mail sorting, but the images are available for possible use by law enforcement agencies.<ref name=APInterview-August2013>[http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-usps-takes-photos-all-mail "AP Interview: USPS takes photos of all mail"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130824061517/http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-usps-takes-photos-all-mail |date=24 August 2013 }}, Associated Press (AP), 2 August 2013.</ref> Created in 2001 following the anthrax attacks that killed five people, it is a sweeping expansion of a 100-year-old program called "[[mail cover]]" which targets people suspected of crimes.<ref name=USMailLogging-NYT-July2013>[https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 "U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement"], Ron Nixon, ''The New York Times'', 3 July 2013. Retrieved 25 September 2013.</ref>

The FBI developed the computer programs "[[Magic Lantern (software)|Magic Lantern]]" and [[CIPAV]], which they can remotely install on a computer system, in order to monitor a person's computer activity.<ref name="teen-busted-in-wired">{{cite news |url=https://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/fbi_spyware |title=FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats |author=Kevin Poulsen |date=18 July 2007 |work=Wired Magazine |publisher=Condé Nast |access-date=19 September 2013}}</ref>

The NSA has been gathering information on financial records, Internet surfing habits, and monitoring e-mails. They have also performed extensive analysis of [[social network analysis|social networks]] such as [[Myspace]].<ref>[https://archive.today/20120720043006/http://news.com.com/2061-10789_3-6082047.html "Is the NSA reading your MySpace profile?"], Dawn Kawamoto, ''CNET News'', 9 June 2006. Retrieved 19 September 2013.</ref>

The [[PRISM (surveillance program)|PRISM]] special source operation system legally immunized private companies that cooperate voluntarily with U.S. intelligence collection. According to ''The Register'', the [[FISA Amendments Act of 2008]] "specifically authorizes intelligence agencies to monitor the phone, email, and other communications of U.S. citizens for up to a week without obtaining a warrant" when one of the parties is outside the U.S.<ref name=guardian6>{{cite web
|url = https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
|title = XKeyscore: NSA tool collects 'nearly everything a user does on the internet'
|author = Glenn Greenwald
|date = 31 July 2013
|work = The Guardian
|access-date = 2 August 2013
|author-link = Glenn Greenwald
}}</ref> PRISM was first publicly revealed on 6 June 2013, after classified documents about the program were leaked to ''The Washington Post'' and ''The Guardian'' by American [[Edward Snowden]].

The [[Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act]] (CALEA) requires that all U.S. telecommunications and Internet service providers modify their networks to allow easy [[Telephone tapping|wiretapping]] of telephone, VoIP, and broadband Internet traffic.<ref name="eff-calea-archive">{{cite web |url=http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/CALEA/?f=archive.html |title=CALEA Archive |publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation |access-date=14 March 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090503035053/http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/CALEA/?f=archive.html |archive-date=3 May 2009 |df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref name="eff-calea-summary">{{cite web |url=https://www.eff.org/issues/calea|title=CALEA: The Perils of Wiretapping the Internet |publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation |access-date=14 March 2009}}</ref><ref name="eff-calea-faq">{{cite web |url=https://www.eff.org/pages/calea-faq|title=FAQ on the CALEA Expansion by the FCC |publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation |access-date=14 March 2009|date=20 September 2007 }}</ref>

In early 2006, ''[[USA Today]]'' reported that several major telephone companies were providing the telephone call records of U.S. citizens to the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA), which is storing them in a large database known as the [[NSA call database]]. This report came on the heels of allegations that the [[Federal government of the United States|U.S. government]] had been conducting electronic surveillance of domestic telephone calls without warrants.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm |title=NSA has massive database of Americans' phone calls |work=USA Today |first=Leslie |last=Cauley |date=11 May 2006 |access-date=12 May 2010}}</ref> In 2013, the existence of the [[Hemisphere Project]], through which AT&T provides telephone call data to federal agencies, became publicly known.

[[Road-rule enforcement camera|Traffic cameras]], which were meant to help enforce traffic laws at intersections, may be used by law enforcement agencies for purposes unrelated to traffic violations.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.edmunds.com/ownership/driving/articles/42961/article.html |title=Caught! Big Brother May Be Watching You With Traffic Cameras |author=Erin Mahoney and Joanne Helperin |publisher=Edmunds |date=3 July 2009 |access-date=19 September 2013}}</ref> Some cameras allow for the identification of individuals inside a vehicle and license plate data to be collected and time stamped for cross reference with other data used by police.<ref>[http://www.persistentsurveillance.com/lawenforcement.html "Law Enforcement Operations"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140504135758/http://www.persistentsurveillance.com/lawenforcement.html |date=4 May 2014 }}, Persistent Surveillance Systems. Retrieved 9 September 2013.</ref> The [[United States Department of Homeland Security|Department of Homeland Security]] is funding networks of surveillance cameras in cities and towns as part of its efforts to combat terrorism.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/us_doles_out_millions_for_street_cameras/?page=full |title=US doles out millions for street cameras |work=The Boston Globe |date=12 August 2007 |first1=Charlie | last1=Savage |access-date=19 September 2013}}</ref>

The [[New York City Police Department]] infiltrated and compiled dossiers on protest groups before the [[2004 Republican National Convention]], leading to over 1,800 arrests.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/nyregion/07police.html?ref=nationalspecial3 |title=City Is Rebuffed on the Release of '04 Records |work=[[The New York Times]] |first=Robert D. |last=McFadden |date=7 August 2007 |access-date=5 April 2010}}</ref>

Modern surveillance in the United States was thought of more of a wartime effort before Snowden disclosed in depth information about the National Security Agency in June 2013.<ref name="van der Vlist 137-157">van der Vlist, Fernando N. 2017. Counter-Mapping Surveillance: A Critical Cartography of Mass Surveillance Technology After Snowden. Surveillance & Society 15(1): 137-157.</ref> The constant development and improvements of the Internet and technology has made it easier for mass surveillance to take hold. Such revelations allow critical commentators to raise questions and scrutinize the implementation, use, and abuse of networking technologies, devices, and software systems that partake in a "global surveillant assemblage" (Bogard 2006; Collier and Ong 2004; Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Murakami Wood 2013).<ref name="van der Vlist 137-157"/> The NSA collected millions of Verizon user's telephone records in between 2013 and 2014. The NSA also collected data through Google and Facebook with a program called 'Prism'. Journalists through Snowden published nearly 7,000 top-secret documents since then, yet the information disclosed seems to be less than 1% of the entire information. Having access to every individual's private records seems to directly contradict the fourth amendment.

===Vietnam===
[[Vietnam]] is one of the five countries on Reporters Without Borders' March 2013 list of "State Enemies of the Internet", countries whose governments are involved in active, intrusive surveillance of news providers, resulting in grave violations of freedom of information and human rights. Most of the country's 16 service providers are directly or indirectly controlled by the [[Vietnamese Communist Party]]. The industry leader, [[Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group]], which controls 74 per cent of the market, is state-owned. So is [[Viettel Mobile|Viettel]], an enterprise of the [[Ministry of Defence (Vietnam)|Vietnamese armed forces]]. FPT Telecom is a private firm, but is accountable to the Party and depends on the market leaders for bandwidth.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

Service providers are the major instruments of control and surveillance. Bloggers monitored by the government frequently undergo [[man-in-the-middle attack]]s. These are designed to intercept data meant to be sent to secure (https) sites, allowing passwords and other communication to be intercepted.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/> According to a July 2012 [[Freedom House]] report, 91 percent of survey respondents connected to the Internet on their mobile devices believe that the government monitors conversations and tracks the calls of "activists" or "reactionaries."<ref>[http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Safety%20on%20the%20Line%20vFINAL.pdf "Country Report: Socialist Republic of Vietnam"], ''Safety on the Line'', Cormac Callanan and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, Freedom House, July 2012. Retrieved 19 September 2013.</ref> In 2018, the [[National Assembly (Vietnam)|Vietnam National Assembly]] also passed a cybersecurity law closely resembling [[Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China|one passed in China]], requiring localisation of user data and censorship of anti-state content.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Vietnam Passes Sweeping New Cybersecurity Law {{!}} Voice of America - English|url=https://www.voanews.com/silicon-valley-technology/vietnam-passes-sweeping-new-cybersecurity-law|access-date=2021-07-25|website=www.voanews.com|language=en}}</ref>

==Commercial mass surveillance==
{{Further|Mass surveillance industry}}
As a result of the [[digital revolution]], many aspects of life are now captured and stored in digital form. Concern has been expressed that governments may use this information to conduct mass surveillance on their populations. Commercial mass surveillance often makes use of [[copyright]] laws and "[[Clickwrap|user agreements]]" to obtain (typically uninformed) 'consent' to surveillance from consumers who use their software or other related materials. This allows gathering of information which would be technically illegal if performed by government agencies. This data is then often shared with government agencies, thereby, in practice, defeating the purpose of such privacy protections.

One of the most common forms of mass surveillance is carried out by commercial organizations. Many people are willing to join supermarket and grocery [[loyalty card]] programs, trading their personal information and surveillance of their shopping habits in exchange for a discount on their groceries, although base prices might be increased to encourage participation in the program.

Through programs like [[Google]]'s [[AdSense]], [[OpenSocial]] and their increasing pool of so-called "web gadgets", "social gadgets", and other Google-hosted services many web sites on the Internet are effectively feeding user information about sites visited by the users, and now also their social connections, to Google. [[Facebook]] also keep this information, although its acquisition is limited to page views within Facebook. This data is valuable for authorities, advertisers and others interested in profiling users, trends and web site marketing performance. Google, Facebook and others are increasingly becoming more guarded about this data as their reach increases and the data becomes more all inclusive, making it more valuable.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://techcrunch.com/2008/05/15/he-said-she-said-in-google-v-facebook/ |title=He Said, She Said in Google v. Facebook |access-date=14 August 2009 |last=Arrington |first=Michael |date=15 May 2008 |work=TechCrunch }}</ref>

New features like [[geolocation]] give an even increased admission of monitoring capabilities to large service providers like Google, where they also are enabled to track one's physical movements while users are using mobile devices, especially those which are syncing without any user interaction. Google's [[Gmail]] service is increasingly employing features to work as a stand-alone application which also might activate while a web browser is not even active for synchronizing; a feature mentioned on the [[Google I/O]] 2009 developer conference while showing the upcoming [[HTML5]] features which Google and others are actively defining and promoting.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/AusOPz8Ww80 Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20090628102524/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AusOPz8Ww80&feature=related Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite conference |title="Google's HTML 5 Work: What's Next?" (62-minute video) |date=28 May 2009 |first=Matthew |last=Papakipos |work=Google I/O 2009 |publisher=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AusOPz8Ww80 |access-date=19 September 2013}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

In 2008 at the [[World Economic Forum]] in [[Davos]], Google CEO Eric Schmidt, said: "The arrival of a truly mobile Web, offering a new generation of location-based advertising, is set to unleash a 'huge revolution'".<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2563364020080125 |title=Google CEO bullish on mobile Web advertising |access-date=28 February 2010 |date=25 January 2008 |publisher=Reuters }}</ref> At the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona on 16 February 2010, Google presented their vision of a new business model for mobile operators and trying to convince mobile operators to embrace [[location-based service]]s and advertising. With Google as the advertising provider, it would mean that every mobile operator using their location-based advertising service would be revealing the location of their mobile customers to Google.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/YuqiE2lukDM Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20101124124157/http://www.youtube.com//watch?v=YuqiE2lukDM Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite conference |title=Keynote speech (video) |work=2010 Mobile World Congress Barcelona |date=16 February 2010 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YuqiE2lukDM |access-date=28 February 2010 |first=Eric |last=Schmidt |publisher=YouTube }}{{cbignore}}</ref>

{{Cquote|Google will also know more about the customer—because it benefits the customer to tell Google more about them. The more we know about the customer, the better the quality of searches, the better the quality of the apps. The operator one is "required", if you will, and the Google one will be optional. And today I would say, a minority choose to do that, but I think over time a majority will... because of the stored values in the servers and so forth and so on....|4=2010 Mobile World Congress keynote speech|5=Google CEO Eric Schmidt<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/BuzSOo50XSg Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20130725225056/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BuzSOo50XSg Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite conference |title=Keynote speech (video) |work=2010 Mobile World Congress Barcelona |date=16 February 2010  |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BuzSOo50XSg |access-date=28 February 2010 |first=Eric |last=Schmidt |publisher=YouTube }}{{cbignore}}</ref>}}

Organizations like the [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]] are constantly informing users on the importance of privacy, and considerations about technologies like geolocation.

Computer company [[Microsoft]] patented in 2011 a product distribution system with a camera or capture device that monitors the viewers that consume the product, allowing the provider to take "remedial action" if the actual viewers do not match the distribution license.<ref>[http://appft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220120278904%22.PGNR.&OS=DN/20120278904&RS=DN/20120278904 "Content distribution regulation by viewing use"], Microsoft Corporation, United States Patent Application 20120278904, 26 April 2011. Retrieved 19 September 2013.</ref>

Reporters Without Borders' March 2013 ''Special report on Internet Surveillance'' contained a list of "Corporate Enemies of the Internet", companies that sell products that are liable to be used by governments to violate human rights and freedom of information. The five companies on the initial list were: [[Amesys]] (France), [[Blue Coat Systems]] (U.S.), [[Gamma Group]] (UK and Germany), [[Hacking Team]] (Italy), and Trovicor (Germany), but the list was not exhaustive and is likely to be expanded in the future.<ref name=RSFSRS-March2013/>

[[Electronic Frontier Foundation|EFF]] found that a company by the name of Fog Data Science purchases location data from apps and sells it to the law enforcement agencies in the U.S. without requiring a warrant or a court order.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Guariglia |first1=Matthew |title=What is Fog Data Science? Why is the Surveillance Company so Dangerous? |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/what-fog-data-science-why-surveillance-company-so-dangerous |access-date=2022-09-04 |publisher=[[Electronic Frontier Foundation|EFF]] |date=2022-08-31}}</ref>

==Surveillance state==
A surveillance state is a country where the government engages in pervasive surveillance of large numbers of its citizens and visitors. Such widespread surveillance is usually justified as being necessary for [[national security]], such as to prevent crime or acts of terrorism, but may also be used to [[Surveillance abuse|stifle criticism of and opposition]] to the government.

[[File:DigiGes PRISM Yes we scan - Demo am Checkpoint Charlie June 2013.jpg|thumb|230px|Germans protesting against the [[National Security Agency|NSA]] surveillance program [[PRISM (surveillance program)|PRISM]] at [[Checkpoint Charlie]] in Berlin]]
Examples of early surveillance states include the former [[Soviet Union]] and the former [[East Germany]], which had a large network of informers and an advanced technology base in computing and spy-camera technology.<ref>[[Manuel Castells]], (August 2009), [http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405196866.html ''The Rise of the Network Society''], 2nd edition, Wiley Blackwell, {{ISBN|978-1-4051-9686-4}}. Retrieved 23 September 2013.</ref> However, these states did not have today's technologies for mass surveillance, such as the use of [[database]]s and [[pattern recognition]] software to cross-correlate information obtained by [[wire tapping]], including [[speech recognition]] and telecommunications [[traffic analysis]], monitoring of financial transactions, [[automatic number plate recognition]], the [[Mobile phone tracking|tracking of the position of mobile telephones]], and [[facial recognition system]]s and the like which recognize people by their appearance, [[Gait (human)|gait]], [[DNA profiling]], etc.

===Smart cities===
{{Main|Smart city}}

The development of smart cities has seen the increased adoption of surveillance technologies by governments, although the primary purpose of surveillance in such cities is to [[Smart city#Characteristics|use information and communication technologies]] to control the urban environment. The implementation of such technology by [[Smart city#Adoption|a number of cities]] has resulted in increased efficiencies in urban infrastructure as well as improved community participation. Sensors and systems monitor a smart city's infrastructure, operations and activities and aim to help it run more efficiently. For example, the city could use less electricity; its traffic run more smoothly with fewer delays; its citizens use the city with more safety; hazards can be dealt with faster; citizen infractions of rules can be prevented, and the city's infrastructure; power distribution and roads with traffic lights for example, dynamically adjusted to respond to differing circumstances.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/09/07/smart_cities_are_surveillance_cities/ | title=Smart cities? Tell it like it is, they're surveillance cities| website=[[The Register]] |date=7 September 2017 |first=Chris |last=Mellor}}</ref>

The development of smart city technology has also led to an increase in potential unwarranted [[Surveillance issues in smart cities#Privacy and autonomy|intrusions into privacy and restrictions upon autonomy]]. The widespread incorporation of information and communication technologies within the daily life of urban residents results in increases in the [[Surveillance issues in smart cities#Panopticism|surveillance capacity of states]] – to the extent that individuals may be unaware of what information is being accessed, when the access occurs and for what purpose. It is possible that such conditions could give rise to the [[Surveillance issues in smart cities#Police state|development of an electronic police state]]. Shanghai, Amsterdam, San Jose, Dubai, Barcelona, Madrid, Stockholm, and New York are all cities that use various techniques from smart city technology.

===Electronic police state===
{{See also|Culture of fear|Surveillance issues in smart cities}}

[[File:Thai-coup-detat-2014-social-media-banner.jpg|thumb|right|400px|Banner in [[Bangkok]], observed on 30 June 2014 during the [[2014 Thai coup d'état]], informing the [[Thailand|Thai]] public that 'like' or 'share' activity on social media could land them in prison]]

An electronic [[police state]] is a [[State (polity)|state]] in which the government aggressively uses electronic technologies to record, collect, store, organize, analyze, search, and distribute information about its citizens.<ref>The first use of the term "electronic police state" was likely in a posting by Jim Davis {{cite journal |date=11 August 1994 |url=http://cu-digest.org/CUDS6/cud6.72 |title=Police Checkpoints on the Information Highway |journal=Computer Underground Digest |volume=6 |issue=72 |issn=1066-632X |quote=The so-called 'electronic frontier' is quickly turning into an electronic police state.}}</ref><ref name=EPS-2008NationalRankings>The term "electronic police state" became more widely known with the publication of [https://secure.cryptohippie.com/pubs/EPS-2008.pdf ''The Electronic Police State: 2008 National Rankings''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307075908/https://secure.cryptohippie.com/pubs/EPS-2008.pdf |date=7 March 2021 }}, by Jonathan Logan, Cryptohippie USA.</ref> Electronic police states also engage in mass government surveillance of [[landline]] and [[cellular phone|cellular]] telephone traffic, mail, email, web surfing, Internet searches, radio, and other forms of electronic communication as well as widespread use of video surveillance. The information is usually collected in secret.

The crucial elements are not politically based, so long as the government can afford the technology and the populace will permit it to be used, an electronic police state can form. The continual use of electronic mass surveillance can result in constant low-level fear within the population, which can lead to [[self-censorship]] and exerts a powerful coercive force upon the populace.<ref name="Applications of Social Control Theory: Criminality and Governmentality">Kingsley Ufuoma OMOYIBO, Ogaga Ayemo OBARO (2012), [http://www.pdoaj.com/pdf-files/ijass,%20pp.1026-1032.pdf "Applications of Social Control Theory: Criminality and Governmentality"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180831215843/http://www.pdoaj.com/pdf-files/ijass,%20pp.1026-1032.pdf |date=31 August 2018 }}, ''International Journal of Asian Social Science'', Vol. 2, No. 7, pp.1026-1032.</ref>

Seventeen factors for judging the development of an electronic police state were suggested in ''The Electronic Police State: 2008 National Rankings'':<ref name=EPS-2008NationalRankings/>
* '''Daily documents''': Requirement for the use and tracking of state-issued [[identity document]]s and registration.
* '''Border and travel control''': Inspections at borders, searching computers and cell phones, demanding decryption of data, and tracking travel within as well as to and from a country.
* '''Financial tracking''': A state's ability to record and search [[financial transaction]]s: checks, credit cards, wires, etc.
* '''Gag orders''': Restrictions on and criminal penalties for the disclosure of the existence of state surveillance programs.
* '''Anti-crypto laws''': Outlawing or restricting [[cryptography]] and/or privacy enhancing technologies.
* '''Lack of constitutional protections''': A lack of constitutional privacy protections or the routine overriding of such protections.
* '''Data storage''': The ability of the state to store the data gathered.
* '''Data search''': The ability to organize and search the data gathered.
* '''Data retention requirements''': Laws that require Internet and other service providers to save detailed records of their customers' Internet usage for a minimum period of time.
** '''Telephone data retention requirements''': Laws that require telephone companies to record and save records of their customers' telephone usage.
** '''Cell phone data retention requirements''': Laws that require cellular telephone companies to record and save records of their customers' usage and location.
* '''Medical records''': Government access to the records of medical service providers.
* '''Enforcement''': The state's ability to use force to seize anyone they want, whenever they want.
* '''Lack of ''habeas corpus''''': Lack of a [[Habeas corpus|right for a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court]] in a timely fashion or the overriding of such rights.
* '''Lack of a police-intel barrier''': The lack of a barrier between police organizations and intelligence organizations, or the overriding of such barriers.
* '''Covert hacking''': State operatives collecting, removing, or adding digital evidence to/from private computers without permission or the knowledge of the computers' owners.
* '''Loose or no warrants''': Arrests or searches made without warrants or without careful examination and review of police statements and justifications by a truly independent judge or other third-party.

The list includes factors that apply to other forms of [[Police State|police states]], such as the use of identity documents and police enforcement, but go considerably beyond them and emphasize the use of technology to gather and process the information collected.

==In popular culture==
{{Main|Mass surveillance in popular culture}}
[[File:1984-Big-Brother.jpg|thumb|1984 slogan "Big Brother is watching you."]]
The concept of being monitored by our governments collects a large audience of curious citizens. Mass surveillance has been prominently featured in a wide array of books, films, and other media. Advances in technology over the last century have led to possible social control through the Internet and the conditions of late capitalism. Many directors and writers have been enthralled with the potential stories that could come from mass surveillance. Perhaps the most iconic example of fictional mass surveillance is [[George Orwell]]'s 1949 novel ''[[Nineteen Eighty-Four]]'', which depicts a [[dystopia]]n surveillance state.

Here are a few other works that focus on mass surveillance:
* ''[[We (novel)|We]]'', a 1920 novel by Russian author [[Yevgeny Zamyatin]] , that predates ''[[Nineteen Eighty-Four]]'' and was read by its author [[George Orwell]].
* ''[[Little Brother (Doctorow novel)|Little Brother]]'' is a novel by [[Cory Doctorow]], and is set in San Francisco after a major terrorist attack. The DHS uses technologies such as RFIDs and surveillance cameras to create a totalitarian system of control.
* ''[[The Lives of Others]]'', is a 2006 German drama film, which conveys the impact that relentless surveillance has on the emotional well-being and the outcome of individuals subjected to it.
* ''[[The Hunger Games]]'' by [[Suzanne Collins]] is a trilogy in which 'the Capitol' has totalitarian surveillance and control over all aspects of the other 'districts'.
* ''[[Digital Fortress]]'', novel by [[Dan Brown]], involving an NSA code breaking machine called 'TRANSLTR'. The machine read and decrypted email messages, with which the NSA used to foil terrorist attacks and mass murders.
*[[Valve Corporation|Valve's]] 2004 video game ''[[Half-Life 2]]'' is set in [[City 17]], a fictional police state in [[Eastern Europe]] in which citizens are under constant surveillance.
* The [[Ubisoft]] video game series ''[[Watch Dogs]]'' is set in the near future with AI connected cities that use surveillance systems to monitor their people in increasingly invasive ways. In particular, ''[[Watch Dogs: Legion]]'' is set in a dystopian [[London]] where an oppressive regime has taken power and incorporates heavy use of surveillance software to control the populace following a series of terrorist attacks.

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* [[2013 global surveillance disclosures]]
* [[Broken windows theory]], a controversial theory that maintaining and monitoring urban environments in a well-ordered condition may stop further vandalism and escalation into more serious crime.
* [[Cellphone surveillance]]
* [[Closed-circuit television]] (CCTV)
* [[Computer and network surveillance]]
* [[COVID-19 surveillance]]
* [[Data privacy]]
* [[Data retention]]
* ''[[Discipline and Punish|Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison]]'', a 1975 book by the French philosopher [[Michel Foucault]].
* {{sectionlink|Fear|Manipulation}}
* [[Global surveillance]]
* [[Government databases]]
* [[IT-backed authoritarianism]]
* [[Lawful interception]]
* [[List of government surveillance projects]]
* [[National security]]
* [[Network theory|Network analysis]]
* [[Nothing to hide argument]]
* [[Pen register]], originally an electronic device that records numbers (but not the audio) called from a particular telephone line, more recently any device or program that performs this function for electronic mail, other digital communications, and particularly communications over the Internet.
* [[Phone surveillance]]
* [[Police state]]
* [[Radio-frequency identification]] (RFID), the wireless identification and tracking of tags attached to objects.
* [[Right to privacy]]
* [[Security culture]]
* [[Signals intelligence]] (SIGINT)
* [[Sousveillance]], the recording of an activity by a participant in the activity, cameras (or other sensors) affixed to property, or surveillance done by non-authorities.
* [[Stakeholder theory]]
* [[Surveillance capitalism]]
* [[Telephone tapping in the Eastern Bloc]]
* [[Tracking system]]
* [[Traffic analysis]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{Reflist |30em}}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
*{{cite IEP |url-id=surv-eth/ |title=Mass surveillance}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20111108000538/http://cle.ens-lyon.fr/08111026/0/fiche___pagelibre/%26RH%3DCDL_ANG100100 "The State and Surveillance: Fear and Control"], Didier Bigo and Mireille Delmas-Marty, ''La Clé des Langues'', 23 September 2011,{{ISSN|2107-7029}}.

{{Domestic national intelligence agencies}}
{{Privacy}}
{{Authority control}}

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[[Category:Mass surveillance| ]]
[[Category:Databases by country|*]]
[[Category:Human rights]]
[[Category:Security]]
[[Category:National security]]
[[Category:Law enforcement]]
[[Category:Law enforcement techniques]]
[[Category:Crime prevention]]
[[Category:Counterterrorism]]