View source for Module:Reason (argument)

{{About|normative factors favoring a belief or action|other related topics|Reasons (disambiguation)|the human faculty of reason or rationality|Reason}}

In the most general terms, a '''reason''' is a consideration which justifies or explains an action, a belief, an attitude, or a fact.<ref>[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reason Merriam-Webster.com] Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of reason</ref>

''[[Normativity|Normative]] reasons'' are what people appeal to when making [[argument]]s about what people should do or believe. For example, that a doctor's patient is grimacing is a reason to believe the patient is in pain. That the patient is in pain is a reason for the doctor to do things to alleviate the pain.

'''Explanatory reasons''' are explanations of why things happened.  For example, the reason the patient is in pain is that her nerves are sending signals from her tissues to her brain.

A reason, in many cases, is brought up by the question "why?", and answered following the word ''because''. Additionally, words and phrases such as ''since'', ''due to'', ''as'', ''considering'' (''that''), ''a result'' (''of''), and ''in order to'', for example, all serve as explanatory locutions that precede the reason to which they refer.

==Types of reason==
In philosophy, it is common to distinguish between three kinds of reason.<ref>{{Citation|last=Alvarez|first=Maria|title=Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation|date=2017|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2017|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2019-01-03}}</ref>

''Normative or justifying reasons'' are often said to be "considerations which count in favor" of some state of affairs (this is, at any rate, a common view, notably held by [[T. M. Scanlon]] and [[Derek Parfit]]).<ref>{{Cite book|title=What We Owe to Each Other|url=https://archive.org/details/whatweowetoeacho00scan|url-access=limited|last=Scanlon|first=T.M.|date=2000-11-15|publisher=Belknap Press|isbn=9780674004238|page=[https://archive.org/details/whatweowetoeacho00scan/page/n23 17]|language=English}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last= Parfit |first= Derek |url=http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/chang/Papers/OnWhatMatters1.pdf |page= |title=On What Matters (forthcoming)|publisher=Rutgers University |date=January 23, 2009 |accessdate=September 16, 2011 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20100331074040/http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/chang/Papers/OnWhatMatters1.pdf |archivedate=March 31, 2010 }}</ref>

''Explanatory reasons'' are considerations which serve to explain why things have happened or why states of affairs are the way they are. In other words, "reason" can also be a synonym for "[[cause]]". For example, a reason a car starts is that its ignition is turned. In the context of explaining the actions of beings who act for reasons (i.e., [[rational agent]]s), these are called ''motivating reasons''—e.g., the reason Bill went to college was to learn; i.e., that he would learn was his motivating reason. At least where a rational agent is acting rationally, her motivating reasons are those considerations which she believes count in favor of her so acting.{{citation needed|reason=Supporting this paragraph with the same &quot;considerations which count in favor&quot; phrasing used to support the previous one blurs the needed distinction and raises doubt about its validity. |date=December 2014}}

==Normative reasons==
Some philosophers (one being [[John Broome (philosopher)|John Broome]]<ref>Broome, John. "Reasons". In ''Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz.'' Edited by R. Jay Wallace et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 28.</ref>) view normative reasons as the same as "explanations of ought facts". Just as explanatory reasons explain why some descriptive fact obtains (or came to obtain), normative reasons on this view explain why some normative facts obtain, i.e., they explain why some state of affairs ought to come to obtain (e.g., why someone should act or why some event ought to take place).

===Epistemic vs. practical reasons===
Philosophers, when discussing reasoning that is influenced by [[norm_(philosophy) | norms]], commonly make a distinction between ''theoretical reason'' and ''practical reason''.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/practical-reason/|title=Practical Reason|last=Wallace|first=R. Jay|date=2014-01-01|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2014|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>  These are capacities that draw on ''epistemic reasons'' (matters of fact and of explanation) or ''practical reasons'' (reasons for action) respectively.  Epistemic reasons (also called ''theoretical'' or '''evidential reasons'''<!--boldface per [[WP:R#PLA]]-->) are considerations which count in favor of believing some proposition to be true.  Practical reasons are considerations which count in favor of some action or the having of some attitude (or at least, count in favor of wanting or trying to bring those actions or attitudes about).

====Epistemic reasons in argumentation====
{{Original research|section|date=January 2012}} 
In [[informal logic]], a reason consists of either a single [[premise]] or [[co-premise]]s in support of an [[argument]]. In [[Logic|formal symbolic logic]], only single premises occur. In informal reasoning, two types of reasons exist. An ''evidential reason'' is a foundation upon which to believe ''that'' or ''why'' a claim is true. An ''explanatory reason'' attempts to convince someone ''how'' something is or could be true, but does not directly convince one ''that it is'' true.

== See also ==
* [[Is-ought problem]]
* [[Normative]]
* [[Positive statement]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Reasoning]]