View source for Module:Sense and reference

{{Short description|Distinction in the philosophy of language}}
{{redirect|Sinn}}
[[File:Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung Frege 1892.jpg|thumb|right|360px| ''Die Gleichheit fordert das Nachdenken heraus durch Fragen, die sich daran knüpfen und nicht ganz leicht zu beantworten sind''. Equality gives rise to challenging questions, which are not altogether easy to answer.]]

In the [[philosophy of language]], the distinction between '''sense''' and '''reference''' was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician [[Gottlob Frege]] in 1892 (in his paper "'''On Sense and Reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA; 'On Sense and Reference' redirects here-->"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"),<ref name=A/> reflecting the two ways he believed a [[singular term]] may have [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]].

The [[reference]] (or "referent"; ''Bedeutung'') of a ''proper name'' is the object it means or indicates (''bedeuten''), whereas its sense (''Sinn'') is what the name expresses. The reference of a ''sentence'' is its [[truth value]], whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses.<ref name=A>"On Sense and Reference" ["Über Sinn und Bedeutung"], ''[[Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik]]'', vol. 100 (1892), pp. 25–50, esp. p. 31.{{primary-inline|date=December 2016}}</ref> Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways.
#Sense is something possessed by a name, whether or not it has a reference. For example, the name "[[Odysseus]]" is intelligible, and therefore has a sense, even though there is no individual object (its reference) to which the name corresponds.
#The sense of different names is different, even when their reference is the same. Frege argued that if an identity statement such as "[[Hesperus]] is the same planet as [[Phosphorus (morning star)|Phosphorus]]" is to be informative, the proper names flanking the identity sign must have a different meaning or sense. But clearly, if the statement is true, they must have the same reference.<ref>"On Sense and Reference", p. 25</ref> The sense is a 'mode of presentation', which serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the referent.<ref>"On Sense and Reference", p. 27</ref>

Much of [[analytic philosophy]] is traceable to Frege's philosophy of language.<ref name=Speaks>Jeff Speaks, [https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2011-12/83104/handouts/frege-reference.pdf "Frege's theory of reference"] (2011)</ref> Frege's views on logic (i.e., his idea that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the [[Argument of a function|arguments]] of a [[Function (mathematics)|mathematical function]]) led to his views on a [[theory of reference]].<ref name=Speaks/>

==Background==
Frege developed his original theory of meaning in early works like ''[[Begriffsschrift]]'' (concept script) of 1879 and ''[[The Foundations of Arithmetic|Grundlagen]]'' (foundations of arithmetic) of 1884. On this theory, the meaning of a complete sentence consists in its being true or false,<ref>Gareth Evans, ''The Varieties of Reference'', Oxford: Clarendon 1982, p. 8</ref> and the meaning of each significant expression in the sentence is an extralinguistic entity which Frege called its ''Bedeutung'', literally meaning or significance, but rendered by Frege's translators as reference, referent, 'Meaning', nominatum, etc. Frege supposed that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the [[Argument of a function|arguments]] of a [[Function (mathematics)|mathematical function]], but that other parts are incomplete, and contain an empty place, by analogy with the function itself.<ref>"Function and Concept", p. 16.</ref> Thus "Caesar conquered Gaul" divides into the complete term "Caesar", whose reference is Caesar himself, and the incomplete term "—conquered Gaul", whose reference is a concept. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence – its truth value – appear. This early theory of meaning explains how the significance or reference of a sentence (its truth value) depends on the significance or reference of its parts.

==Sense==
[[File:Mengs, Hesperus als Personifikation des Abends.jpg|thumb|right|160px|[[Hesperus]]]]
[[File:Jean-Marc Nattier, The Countess de Brac as Aurora (1741).jpg|thumb|right|140px|[[Phosphorus (morning star)|Phosphorus]]]] 
Frege introduced the notion of "sense" (German: ''Sinn'') to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning.<ref>[[Barbara Cassin|Cassin, B.]], Apter, E., Lezra, J., & [[Michael Wood (academic)|Wood, M.]], eds., ''Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon'' ([[Princeton, New Jersey|Princeton]]: [[Princeton University Press]], 2014), [https://books.google.com/books?id=UXP5AQAAQBAJ&pg=PA965 p. 965].</ref>{{rp|965}}

First, if the entire significance of a sentence consists of its truth value, it follows that the sentence will have the same significance if we replace a word of the sentence with one having an identical reference, as this will not change its truth value.<ref name="On Sense and Reference, p. 32">"On Sense and Reference", p. 32.</ref> The reference of the whole is determined by the reference of the parts. If ''the evening star'' has the same reference as ''the morning star'', it follows that ''the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun'' has the same truth value as ''the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun''. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true while also thinking that the second is false. Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its ''sense''.

Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. Yet the sentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at [[Homer's Ithaca|Ithaca]] while sound asleep' obviously has a sense, even though 'Odysseus' has no reference. The thought remains the same whether or not 'Odysseus' has a reference.<ref name="On Sense and Reference, p. 32"/> Furthermore, a thought cannot contain the objects that it is about. For example, [[Mont Blanc]], 'with its snowfields', cannot be a component of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 metres high. Nor can a thought about [[Mount Etna|Etna]] contain lumps of solidified lava.<ref>See Frege's undated letter to [[Philip Jourdain]], published in ''Frege's Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence'', ed. Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kanbartel, Christian Thiel and Albet Veraart, transl. Hans Kaal, Oxford: Blackwell 1980. (See also Frege's letter to Russell dated 1904, in the same collection.)</ref>

Frege's notion of sense is somewhat obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role.<ref>Sam Cumming, [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/names/Names Names], ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' 2013.</ref> Accounts based on the work of [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap]]<ref>''[[Meaning and Necessity]]'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.</ref> and [[Alonzo Church|Church]]<ref>“A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation”, in P. Henle, M. Kallen, and S. K. Langer, eds., ''Structure, Method, and Meaning'', New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951</ref> treat sense as an [[intension]], or a function from [[possible world]]s to [[Extension (semantics)|extensions]]. For example, the intension of ‘number of planets’ is a function that maps any possible world to the number of planets in that world. [[John McDowell]] supplies cognitive and reference-determining roles.<ref>McDowell, J., [https://books.google.com/books?id=4CZ1zeQAFT8C&pg=PA171 “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name”], [[Mind (journal)|''Mind'']], 86: 159–85, 1977.</ref> [[Michael Devitt]] treats senses as causal-historical chains connecting names to referents, allowing that repeated "groundings" in an object account for reference change.<ref>Devitt, M., ''Designation'', New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.</ref>

==Sense and description==
In his [[theory of descriptions]], [[Bertrand Russell]] held the view that most proper names in ordinary language are in fact disguised [[definite description]]s. For example, 'Aristotle' can be understood as "The pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander", or by some other uniquely applying description. This is known as the [[descriptivist theory of names]]. Because Frege used definite descriptions in many of his examples, he is often taken to have endorsed the descriptivist theory. Thus Russell's theory of descriptions was conflated with Frege's theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century this "Frege–Russell" view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics. However, [[Saul Kripke]] argued compellingly against the descriptivist theory. According to Kripke,<ref>Kripke, S. A., ''Naming and Necessity'', Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press]], 1980, [https://books.google.com/books?id=9vvAlOBfq0kC&lpg=PP1&hl=de&pg=PA48 pp. 48-49].</ref>{{rp|48–49}} proper names are [[rigid designator]]s which designate the same object in every possible world. Descriptions such as "the President of the U.S. in 1969" do not designate the same in every possible world. For example, someone other than [[Richard Nixon]], e.g. [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], might have been the President in 1969. Hence a description (or cluster of descriptions) cannot be a rigid designator, and thus a proper name cannot ''mean'' the same as a description.<ref>''Naming and Necessity'', [https://books.google.com/books?id=9vvAlOBfq0kC&lpg=PP1&hl=de&pg=PA57 p. 57].</ref>{{rp|57}}

However, the Russellian descriptivist reading of Frege has been rejected by many scholars, in particular by [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] in ''The Varieties of Reference''<ref>{{cite book|last=Evans|first=Gareth|title=The Varieties of Reference|year=1982|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|editor=John McDowell}}</ref> and by [[John McDowell]] in "The Sense and Reference of a Proper Name",<ref>{{cite journal|last=McDowell|first=John|title=On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name|journal=Mind|date=April 1977|volume=86|series=New Series|issue=342}}</ref> following [[Michael Dummett]], who argued that Frege's notion of sense should not be equated with a description. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible. He and McDowell both take the line that Frege's discussion of empty names, and of the idea of sense without reference, are inconsistent, and that his apparent endorsement of descriptivism rests only on a small number of imprecise and perhaps offhand remarks. And both point to the power that the sense-reference distinction ''does'' have (i.e., to solve at least the first two problems), even if it is not given a descriptivist reading.

==Translation of ''Bedeutung''==
As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German ''Bedeutung'' in various ways. The term 'reference' has been the most widely adopted, but this fails to capture the meaning of the original German ('meaning' or 'significance'), and does not reflect the decision to standardise key terms across different editions of Frege's works published by [[Wiley-Blackwell#Blackwell Publishing history|Blackwell]].<ref>According to M. Beaney (ed., ''The Frege Reader'', Oxford: Blackwell 1997, p. 36) 'the decision was taken at a meeting in the early 1970s attended by Michael Dummett, [[Peter Geach]], [[William Kneale]], Roger White and a representative from Blackwell. The translation of ''Bedeutung'' by 'meaning' was unanimously agreed after lengthy discussion'.</ref> The decision was based on the principle of [[exegetical neutrality]]:  that "if at any point in a text there is a passage that raises for the native speaker legitimate questions of [[exegesis]], then, if at all possible, a translator should strive to confront the reader of his version with the same questions of exegesis and not produce a version which in his mind resolves those questions".<ref>Long, P. and White, A., 'On the Translation of Frege's ''Bedeutung'': A Reply to Dr. Bell', ''Analysis'' 40 pp. 196-202, 1980, p. 196. See also Bell, D., "On the Translation of Frege's ''Bedeutung''", ''Analysis'' Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), pp. 191-195.</ref> The term 'meaning' best captures the standard German meaning of ''Bedeutung''. However, while Frege's own use of the term can sound as odd in German for modern readers as when translated into English, the related term ''deuten'' does mean 'to point towards'. Though ''Bedeutung'' is not usually used with this etymological proximity in mind in German, German speakers can well make sense of ''Bedeutung'' as signifying 'reference', in the sense of it being what ''Bedeutung'' points, i.e. refers to. Moreover, 'meaning' captures Frege's early use of ''Bedeutung'' well,<ref>Beaney, p. 37</ref> and it would be problematic to translate Frege's early use as 'meaning' and his later use as 'reference', suggesting a change in terminology not evident in the original German.

==Precursors==
===Antisthenes===
The Greek philosopher [[Antisthenes]], a pupil of [[Socrates]], apparently distinguished "a general object that can be aligned with the meaning of the utterance” from “a particular object of extensional reference". According to Susan Prince, this "suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference".<ref>{{cite book|last=Prince|first=S. H. |title=Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary|publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]]|year=2015}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=i8IhCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=de&pg=PA20 p. 20].</ref>{{rp|20}}
The principal basis of Prince's claim is a passage in [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]]' “Comments on [[Aristotle]]'s 'Topics'” with a three-way distinction: 
# the semantic medium, δι' ὧν λέγουσι
# an object external to the semantic medium, περὶ οὗ λέγουσιν
# the direct indication of a thing, σημαίνειν ... τὸ ...<ref>Prince 2015, [https://books.google.com/books?id=i8IhCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=de&pg=PA518 pp. 518–522] (Antisthenes' literary remains: t. 153B.1).</ref>{{rp|518–522}}

===Stoicism===
The [[Stoicism|Stoic]] doctrine of {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy of language#Ancient philosophy|lekta]]}} refers to a correspondence between speech and the object referred to in speech, as distinct from the speech itself. British classicist [[Robert Sharples (classicist)|R. W. Sharples]] cites ''lekta'' as an anticipation of the distinction between sense and reference.<ref>R. W. Sharples (1996), ''Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy''. Routledge, [https://books.google.com/books?id=KlmKAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=de&pg=PA23 p. 23].</ref>{{rp|23}}

===John Stuart Mill===
The sense-reference distinction is commonly confused with that between [[connotation]] and [[denotation]], which originates with [[John Stuart Mill]].<ref>See section §5 of book I, chapter i of Mill's [[A System of Logic]]</ref> According to Mill, a common term like 'white' ''denotes'' all white things, as snow, paper.<ref>[[:nl:Willem Remmelt de Jong|Jong, W. R. de]], ''The Semantics of John Stuart Mill'' ([[Dordrecht]]: [[D. Reidel]], 1982), [https://books.google.com/books?id=q2gqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 pp. 11–13].</ref>{{rp|11–13}} But according to Frege, a common term does not refer to any individual white thing, but rather to an abstract concept (''Begriff''). We must distinguish between the relation of reference, which holds between a proper name and the object it refers to, such as between the name 'Earth' and the planet [[Earth]], and the relation of 'falling under', such as when the Earth falls under the concept ''planet''. The relation of a proper name to the object it designates is direct, whereas a word like 'planet' has no such direct relation to the Earth at all, but only to a concept that the Earth falls under. Moreover, judging ''of'' anything that it falls under this concept is not in any way part of our knowledge of what the word 'planet' means.<ref>Frege, "A critical elucidation of some points in E. Schroeder's ''Vorlesungen Ueber Die Algebra der Logik'', ''Archiv für systematische Philosophie'' 1895, pp. 433-456, transl. Geach, in Geach & Black 86-106.{{primary-inline|date=December 2016}}</ref> The distinction between connotation and denotation is closer to that between concept and object than to that between 'sense' and 'reference'.

== See also ==
{{Wikisource|On Sense and Reference}}
* [[Descriptivist theory of names]]
* [[Definite description]]
* [[Direct and indirect realism]]
* [[Frege's puzzles]]
* [[Intensional logic]]
* [[Mediated reference theory]]
* [[Temperature paradox]]
* [[:Category:Theories of language|Theories of language]]
* [[Use–mention distinction]]

==Footnotes==
{{reflist|30em}}

{{philosophy of language}}
{{analytic philosophy}}
{{Formal semantics}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Sense And Reference}}
[[Category:Philosophy of language]]
[[Category:Philosophical logic]]
[[Category:Conceptual distinctions]]
[[Category:Meaning (philosophy of language)]]